# E-FILED IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE PIERCE COUNTY, WASHINGTON

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KEVIN STOCK
COUNTY CLERK
COUNTY CLERK NO: 14-2-10487-7

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7	STATE OF	WASHINGTON		
8	STATE OF WASHINGTON PIERCE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT			
9	MMH, LLC, a Washington Limited Liability Company,	NO. 14-2-10487-7		
10	Plaintiff,	ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MOTION TO INTERVENE		
11	v.			
12	CITY OF FIFE,			
13	Defendant.			
14				
15	The Attorney General of the State of Washington, by and through the undersigned			
16	counsel, hereby moves to intervene in this a	ction. This motion is based upon RCW 7.24.110		
17	and CR 24(a).			
18	I. IDENTI	TY OF INTERVENOR		
19	The Attorney General is an officer	of the executive branch of state government,		

elected by the voters of Washington. The Washington Constitution provides that the Attorney 20 General is the legal advisor of state officers. Const. art. III, § 21. 21

## II. NATURE OF CASE

Plaintiff commenced this action to challenge an ordinance of the City of Fife 23 prohibiting marijuana-related businesses within the city. In 2012, Washington voters enacted 24 an initiative measure to establish a licensing and regulatory system governing the distribution 25 and possession of marijuana for recreational purposes. Laws of 2013, ch. 3 (codified as part 26

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of chapter 69.50 RCW). That measure, Initiative 502 (I-502), directs the Washington State
 Liquor Control Board to establish a system for issuing licenses to producers, processors, and
 retailers of marijuana. RCW 69.50.325 through .369. Certain otherwise applicable state law
 criminal penalties do not apply to actions performed by licensees under I-502.
 RCW 69.50.360.

Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and other relief invalidating the City's ordinance. Evaluating the claims will require the Court to interpret I-502 and determine whether, under the initiative and the Washington Constitution, state law preempts local authority to legislate on this subject. The Attorney General, and state officers and agencies served by the Attorney General as their legal counsel, are assigned various responsibilities for implementing I-502. The Attorney General therefore has an interest in this action.

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# III. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTEREST IN INTERVENING

The Attorney General moves to intervene to address the implementation of I-502. The 13 declaratory judgments act provides that the Attorney General is entitled to be heard in any 14 action in which a party contends that a state law or local ordinance is unconstitutional. 15 RCW 7.24.110. Plaintiff contends that the local ordinance at issue is unconstitutional as being 16 preempted by I-502. The Attorney General is therefore entitled to intervene in this case as a 17 18 matter of right. CR 24(a)(1) (providing that "anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action . . . when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene"). In the alternative, the 19 Attorney General is permitted to intervene under Rule 24(b) because this Court's construction 20 of I-502 could affect the initiative's implementation by state officers and agencies. 21

No court has yet interpreted 1-502 to determine whether it preempts city ordinances like this one. The Attorney General has issued a formal opinion concluding that I-502 does not preempt local ordinances such as the one the City enacted here. AGO 2014 No. 2. The Attorney General's proposed Answer to the Amended Complaint, setting forth the defenses for which intervention is sought, is attached as Exhibit A. CR 24(c) (requiring an applicant

for intervention to provide a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention
 is sought).

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3	IV. CONCLUSION
4	For these reasons, this Court should grant the Motion of the Attorney General of the
5	State of Washington to intervene in this matter. This Court should also accept for filing the
6	Attorney General's [Proposed] Answer to the Complaint, attached as Exhibit A hereto.
7	DATED this $31^{st}$ day of July, 2014.
8	DODEDT W FEDCISON
9	ROBERT W. FERGUSON Attorney General
10	NOAH G. PURCELL, WSBA # 43492 Solicitor General
11	ald. Ever
12	JEFFREY T. EVEN, WSBA #20367
13	Deputy Solicitor General
14	PO Box 40100 Olympia, WA 98504-0100 360-753-6200
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16	· Counsel for Attorney General
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 1125 Washington Street SE PO Box 40100 Olympia, WA 98504-0100 (360) 753-6200

# **EXHIBIT** A

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7		SHINCTON	
8	STATE OF WASHINGTON PIERCE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT		
9	MMH, LLC, a Washington Limited Liability Company,	NO. 14-2-10487-7	
10		ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR	
11		DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND WRIT OF	
12		MANDAMUS	
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15	The Attorney General of the State of Washington, by and through the undersigned		
16	counsel, answers Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and Writ of		
17	Mandamus as follows:		
18	I. INTRO	I. INTRODUCTION	
19	1. The Attorney General responds	to the allegations of paragraph 1 of the	
20	Complaint by admitting Plaintiff's characterization of its cause of action, and that the City of		
21	Fife has adopted a local ordinance prohibiting marijuana-related businesses in the City. The		
22	remaining allegations set forth within paragraph 1 consist of characterizations of the City's		
23	ordinance, which speaks for itself.		

2. The Attorney General responds to the allegations of paragraph 2 of the
25 Complaint by admitting that that Plaintiff has applied with the state Liquor Control Board for
26 a license as a marijuana-related businesses, but denies that Plaintiff has any vested right to

1	receive such a license. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information or belief to admit or		
2	deny the remaining allegations of paragraph 2, and on that basis denies those allegations.		
3	3. Paragraph 3 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law to which		
4	no response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response may be		
5	required, the Attorney General denies the allegations of paragraph 3.		
6	4. Paragraph 4 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law to which		
7	no response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response may be		
8	required, the Attorney General denies the allegations of paragraph 4.		
9	II. PARTIES		
10	5. The Attorney General admits the facts alleged in paragraph 5 of the Complaint.		
11	6. The Attorney General admits the facts alleged in paragraph 6 of the Complaint.		
12	III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE		
13	7. The Attorney Generals admits that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction		
14	over this action.		
15	8. The Attorney General admits that jurisdiction and venue are proper in this		
16	County.		
17	IV. FACTS		
18	9. The Attorney General admits the facts alleged in paragraph 9 of the Complaint,		
19	except that the Attorney General denies that the administrative rules codified in chapter 31-55		
20	WAC are part of Initiative 502. Rather, those provisions consist of administrative rules		
21	adopted by the Liquor Control Board to implement Initiative 502.		
22	10. Paragraph 10 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law to which no		
23	response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response may be required,		
24	the Attorney General denies the allegations of paragraph 10 as mischaracterizing and		
25	overstating the provisions of Initiative 502.		

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1 11. Paragraph 11 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law to which
 no response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response may be
 required, the Attorney General admits that Initiative 502 established a regulatory and licensing
 system for marijuana-related businesses.

5 12. Paragraph 12 of the Complaint describes section 1 of Initiative 502, which
6 speaks for itself and requires no response by way of factual pleading.

13. Paragraph 13 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law to which no response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response is required, the Attorney General denies that those allegations support the relief requested.

14. Paragraph 14 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law to which no response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response is required, the Attorney General denies that those allegations support the relief requested.

13 15. Paragraph 15 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law to which no
response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response is required, the
Attorney General denies that those allegations support the relief requested.

16 16. Paragraph 16 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law to which no
17 response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response is required, the
18 Attorney General denies that those allegations support the relief requested.

17. Paragraph 17 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law to which no response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response is required, the Attorney General denies that those allegations support the relief requested.

18. Paragraph 18 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law to which no response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response is required, the Attorney General denies that those allegations support the relief requested.

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19. Paragraph 19 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law to which no 1 response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response is required, the 2 Attorney General denies that those allegations support the relief requested.

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20. The Attorney General admits the facts alleged in paragraph 20 of the Complaint.

The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the 5 21. allegations of paragraph 21 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations. 6

The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the 22. 7 allegations of paragraph 22 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations. 8

> 23. The Attorney General admits the facts alleged in paragraph 23 of the Complaint.

The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the 24. allegations of paragraph 24 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the 25. 12 allegations of paragraph 25 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

26. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the 14 allegations of paragraph 26 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations. 15

16 27. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 27 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations. 17

The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the 18 28. allegations of paragraph 28 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations. 19

The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the 29. allegations of paragraph 29 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the 22 30. allegations of paragraph 30 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations. 23

The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the 24 31. allegations of paragraph 31 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations. 25

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32. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 32 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

33. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 33 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

34. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 34 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

35. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 35 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

36. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 36 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

37. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the
allegations of paragraph 37 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

38. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the
allegations of paragraph 38 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations,
except that the Attorney General admits that there are licensing fees associated with applying
for a license from the Liquor Control Board.

39. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 39 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

40. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 40 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

41. The Attorney General admits the allegations of paragraph 41 of the Complaint

42. The Attorney General denies that the law supports granting the relief requested in paragraph 42 of the Complaint.

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# V. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION—STATUTORY PREEMPTION

43. The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of theallegations set forth in paragraphs 1-42 of this Answer.

44. Paragraph 44 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law, to which no response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent response may be required, the Attorney General denies the legal conclusions expressed in paragraph 44.

45. Paragraph 45 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law, to which no response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response may be required, the Attorney General admits that the Washington Constitution vests cities, towns, and counties with broad local authority to legislate as to matters of local concern, so long as such local legislation does not violate the Constitution or is preempted by state law.

46. Paragraph 46 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law, to which no response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response may be required, the Attorney General denies those allegations, and specifically denies that RCW 69.50.608 preempts the local legislation at issue.

13 47. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the14 allegations of paragraph 47 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

48. Paragraph 48 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law, to which
no response by way of factual pleading is required. To the extent that response may be
required, the Attorney General denies that RCW 69.50.608 preempts the local legislation at
issue.

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# VI. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION—CONSTITUTIONAL PREEMPTION

49. The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-48 of this Answer.

50. The Attorney General admits that paragraph 50 of the Complaint quotes articleXI, section 11 of the Washington Constitution.

24 51. Paragraph 51 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law, to which
25 no response by way of factual pleading is required. The extent that response may be required,

the Attorney General denies that Paragraph 51 sets forth a full or complete statement of the
 law of preemption under the Washington Constitution as it applies to this case.

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52. Paragraph 52 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law, to which no response by way of factual pleading is required. The extent that response may be required, the Attorney General denies that Paragraph 52 sets forth a full or complete statement of the law of preemption under the Washington Constitution as it applies to this case. The Attorney General alleges that Initiative 502 does not preempt the local legislation challenged in this action.

9 53. Paragraph 53 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law, to which
10 no response by way of factual pleading is required. The extent that response may be required,
11 the Attorney General denies that Paragraph 53 sets forth a full or complete statement of the
12 law of preemption under the Washington Constitution as it applies to this case. The Attorney
13 General alleges that Initiative 502 does not preempt the local legislation challenged in this
14 action.

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# VII. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION—INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

16 54. The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the17 allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-53 of this Answer.

55. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 55 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

20 56. Paragraph 56 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law, to which
21 no response by way of factual pleading is required. The extent that response may be required,
22 the Attorney General denies those allegations.

23 57. Paragraph 57 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law, to which
24 no response by way of factual pleading is required. The extent that response may be required,
25 the Attorney General denies those allegations.

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# VIII. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION-MANDAMUS RELIEF

58. The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-57 of this Answer.

59. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information and belief to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 59 of the Complaint, and on that basis denies those allegations.

60. Paragraph 60 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law, to which no response by way of factual pleading is required. The extent that response may be required, the Attorney General denies those allegations.

9 61. Paragraph 61 of the Complaint consists entirely of allegations of law, to which
10 no response by way of factual pleading is required. The extent that response may be required,
11 the Attorney General denies those allegations.

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# IX. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION—EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

62. The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-61 of this Answer.

63. Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action sets forth allegations that are applicable only to the Defendant City of Fife. The Attorney General accordingly takes no position regarding Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action (Paragraphs 62-67 of the Complaint).

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# X. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION—INVERSE CONDEMNATION

64. The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-63 of this Answer.

65. Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action sets forth allegations that are applicable only to the Defendant City of Fife. The Attorney General accordingly takes no position regarding Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action (Paragraphs 68-73 of the Complaint).

# XI. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

By way of further answer and affirmative defense, the Attorney General alleges:

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1	1.	Plaintiff's Complaint fails to set forth any cause of action upon which relief
2	can be granted	1.
3		XII. REQUEST FOR RELIEF
4	Having	g fully answered the Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, the
5	Attorney General requests as follows:	
6	1.	That Plaintiff's requested relief be DENIED and Plaintiff take nothing by way
7	of this action;	
8	2.	That the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice;
9	3.	That the Attorney General be awarded its costs and allowable attorney fees;
10	and	
11	4.	That the Court award such other and further relief as may be just and equitable.
12		DATED this $37^{3}$ day of July, 2014.
13		ROBERT W. FERGUSON
14		Attorney General
15		NOAH G. PURCELL, WSBA # 43492 Solicitor General
16		Not J. E von
17		JEFFREY T. EVEN, WSBA #20367
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21		Counsel for Attorney General
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