

Threat Assessment
4/2 Deployment (Fort Lewis – Port of Tacoma)
2-3 and 5-9 MAR 07

1. **BACKGROUND:** Anti-war, anti-military, and anti-military recruiting efforts continue in the Pacific Northwest. Most recently with a large scale demonstration (turnout +1000 persons) on 5 FEB 07 supporting LT Watada, and there multiple anti military recruiting events planned in Olympia, Tacoma, Seattle and Portland on 24 FEB 07. Olympia based anti-war and anti-port militarization groups and individuals are planning peaceful civil disobedience actions should 4/2 deploy through the Port of Olympia. Their campaign plan includes addressing Olympia City Council and Port Commission meetings as well as disseminating information via local new media, on activist web sites, and in public protest activities. There are no indications, at this time, that Olympia based groups will travel to Fort Lewis or Tacoma to protest 4/2 deployment operations through Tacoma.

a. Anti-war and anti-military organizations in Washington state have conducted at times peaceful and at other times disruptive activities against military deployment operations since 2004, primarily at the Port of Olympia.

b. Visible military movements and equipment enroute to, and at, the Port will likely reenergize anti-war/anti-military interest. Previous surveillance activities have included picture taking of military equipment, posting those pictures on activist websites, and conducting probing activity around the port perimeter fencing during very late evening and early morning hours.

c. Any release of Convoy information will facilitate protest planning.

d. Anti-war or anti-military protest activities could provide cover for other criminal or terrorist activities.

e. There are no indications of terrorist or extremist interest in military convoy or transit operations at the Port of Tacoma or Port of Olympia.

f. Interstate 5 traffic. There is projected heavy I5 N/S on 4 Mar 07//2230L-2330L. Tacoma Dome has a concert (Rascal Flats) starting at 4/1930L to 4/2230L with an estimated attendance of 30,000. We will be starting brigade convoys now on 5 Mar 07//0001L till 5 Mar 07//0500L. Attached is the updated adjusted convoys For for 5 March 07.

2. **Vulnerability: Crowds, anti-war or anti-military activities, criminals, and terrorists.** During military operations, multiple vantage points provide unlimited visibility and line of sight into the Port Area. Vehicle staging areas are proximate to the fence line and vulnerable to vandalism (paint thrown or sprayed through the fence, paint balloons, rock throwing, BB/Pellet gun or small arms fire) or attack (thrown

incendiary or improvised explosive devices). There is an overpass adjacent to the Vehicle Staging Area. This overpass can facilitate access over the Staging Area fence and / or a high ground launch area for vandalism (paint thrown or sprayed through the fence, paint balloons, rock throwing, BB/Pellet gun or small arms fire) or attack (thrown incendiary or improvised explosive devices). Port of Tacoma has high Train traffic in and out of the secured area. This movement is facilitated by gates that remain open during high traffic periods. The gates have camera coverage, but may not be monitored at all times. During hours of darkness or limited visibility movement by persons in or out of the gates undetected is possible. Secured gates and fences around the port secure area do not have barbed wire along the top or alarms, and may easily be climbed without detection.

3. **Threat Courses of Action (COA):**

- a. Anti-war or anti-military activities along the route to, or at the Port of Tacoma.
- b. Anti-war or anti-military activities that escalate into an attempt to damage or destroy US Military property in the Port area.
- c. Anti-war or anti-military activities that attempt to impede access to the port or loading of US Military property onto ships.

(1) Anti-war or anti-military activists deliberate effort to cause a civilian – military traffic accident.

(2) Anti-war or anti-military activists conduct establish human roadblocks at Start Points, enroute, or at ingress points to the port area.

d. Criminal elements, either alone or during anti-war or anti-military activities, attempt to steal military equipment (property crime).

e. Terrorist or extremist elements that attack military equipment, personnel, deployment support facilities, or the ship.

f. **Most likely Threat COA.** An anti-war or anti-military event staged to gain media attention (i.e. banner hanging, signage, demonstration).

g. **Most dangerous Threat COA.** An attack with improvised explosive or incendiary device to damage or destroy military equipment in the Port area. Some equipment may be within meters of the outer fence line and vulnerable to a thrown Molotov cocktail or improvised explosive device.

4. **Threat COA Mitigation.**

- a. Property Crime Mitigation.

- (1) Restrict parking area and facility access to authorized personnel only.
- (2) Establish walking patrols to detect suspicious personnel.
- (3) Establish security presence inside key facilities.
- (4) Increase distances from vehicle parking to the Port Fence line to limit ability of protestors to damage vehicles by throwing items over the fence. Consider using

shipping containers as a visible/physical barrier within the Port staging area to screen vehicle parking area

b. Anti-war Protests Mitigation.

- (1) Law enforcement on standby and prepared to respond.
- (2) Be prepared to increase security at access control points and fence line.
- (3) Coordinate all convoy, or line haul traffic with local law enforcement.
- (4) Consider early morning and late night operations.
- (5) Limit the amount of time military stock is present and/or visible at the Port.

c. Counter Surveillance/Elicitation/Intelligence collection.

- (1) Brief all personnel on reporting requirements.
- (2) Maintain operational security on all plans, dates, and times.
- (3) Conduct continual inspections of the fence line area for any possible damage or breaches.

5. Possible Threat Tactics, techniques, and Procedures.

a. Waterborne threats include small boats/kayaks attempting to enter the exclusion area around the ship, or infiltrate personnel into the port area. Kayaks able to carry up to 600 lbs are commercially available.

b. Land based threats include demonstrators, and criminal or terrorist elements using the demonstrators to screen their approach, preparations, or activities.

c. Threats against convoys and line haul include obstacles to block or impede ingress-egress into the port area, or obstacles blocking routes to the Port of Tacoma. These obstacles could include vehicles or people.

6. Priority Intelligence Requirements:

- Where/how will the threat access the Port of Tacoma (PoT) Area?
- How will the threat conceal items used to gain access to the port area or that could be used to penetrate fences, locks, etc.? (Bolt/wire cutters)
- Where/how will the threat infiltrate PoT area?
- Where will antiwar or anti military activities be conducted for increased effects/media impact?
- How will the threat travel to reach the PoT area?
- Will protestors, criminal, or other threat elements conduct surveillance, make frequent drive bys of the PoT area?
- Will groups or individuals ask questions concerning port access, security or staging of military equipment for shipping?

7. Reporting Requirements

For Official Use Only

a. During planned movement windows, and/or once equipment is staged at the PoT, gatherings of personnel with flags, banners, or placards espousing anti war or anti military themes.

b. Personnel loitering in the PoT area, conducting multiple walk around the area, or multiple drive bys of the PoT area. Personnel involved in these activities taking pictures, videotape, talking on radios, or cell phones.

c. Unauthorized personnel making attempts to enter the PoT area

d. Suspicious surveillance activities being conducted by personnel not directly working at the Port of Tacoma. (Photo taking, videotaping, climbing fences or looking through fences for viewing, and anyone loitering).

(1) Do any suspicious groups or individuals carry equipment that could be used to penetrate fences, locks, etc.? (Bolt/wire cutters).

(2) Do any suspicious groups or individuals carry video, camera, surveillance equipment?

e. Any indications of anti-war or military protest activity within a block or along the convoy near the Port of Tacoma.

(1) If there are any protesters around the port or staging area, are they carrying signs/banners and equipment such as gas masks, scarves helmets, sticks, bullhorns or wearing certain colors of clothing, etc.?

(2) If there are any protestors around the Port or staging area, are they conducting activities at multiple areas, are they coordinating their activities with cell phones or handheld radios

f. Report any approaching of groups or individuals asking questions concerning port access, security or staging of military equipment for shipping.

Demonstration Tactics, techniques and Procedures. If a demonstration is going to take place in a secure facility, activists may seek to gain access to the site using false documentation. Surveillance of sites prior to demonstrations can allow activists to identify locations of command posts and law enforcement personnel in order to plan effective countermeasures.

Traditional demonstration tactics by which protestors draw attention to their causes include marches, banners, and forms of passive resistance such as sit-ins. Extremist elements may engage in more aggressive tactics that can include vandalism, physical harassment of delegates, trespassing, the formation of human chains or shields, makeshift barricades, devices used against mounted police units, and the use of weapons-such as projectiles and homemade bombs. Even the more peaceful techniques can create a climate of disorder, block access to a site, draw large numbers of police officers to a specific location in order to weaken security at other locations, obstruct traffic, and possibly intimidate people from attending the events being protested.

For Official Use Only

During the course of a demonstration, activists often communicate with one another using cell phones or radios to coordinate activities or to update colleagues about ongoing events. Other types of media equipment (video cameras, photographic equipment, audio tape recorders, microphones, and computer and radio equipment) may be used for documenting potential cases of police brutality and for distribution of information over the Internet.

Extremists may be prepared to defend themselves against law enforcement officials during the course of a demonstration. Masks (gas masks, goggles, scarves, scuba masks, filter masks, and sunglasses) can serve to minimize the effects of tear gas and pepper spray as well as obscure one's identity. Extremists may also employ shields (trashcan lids, sheets of Plexiglas, truck tire inner tubes, etc.) and body protection equipment (layered clothing, hard hats and helmets, sporting equipment, life jackets, etc.) to protect themselves during marches. Activists may also use intimidation techniques such as videotaping and the swarming of police officers to hinder the arrest of other demonstrators.

After demonstrations, activists are usually reluctant to cooperate with law enforcement officials. They seldom carry any identification papers and often refuse to divulge any information about themselves or other protestors. Post-demonstration activities can include fundraising in support of the legal defense of accused protestors and demonstrations of solidarity calling for the release of the accused.

9. POC: Mr Tom Rudd, FP Division Chief, DES at 253-966-6914, 253-677-9752 (cell) or thomas.r.rudd@conus.army.mil

THOMAS R. RUDD
GS13, DAC
FPS/ATO and FP DIV Chief

