Under RCW 46.20.0371, the Department of Licensing is required to submit a report to the Governor and the legislature on investigations based on Facial Recognition Matching System (FRMS) results and related data during the previous fiscal year by October 1 of each year. This report is for the fiscal year beginning on July 1, 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total number of potential matches identified by FRMS</td>
<td>176,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Investigations initiated by the department due to FRMS</td>
<td>Not availableA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determinations that a person committed a prohibited practice under RCW 46.20.0921</td>
<td>1,173B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hearings requested</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Determinations that were confirmed by a hearings examiner</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Determinations that were overturned by a hearings examiner</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Number of cases where a person declined a hearing or did not attend a scheduled hearing</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Number of determinations that were referred to law enforcement</td>
<td>9c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A All 176,970 potential matches were visually inspected by DOL staff. The vast majority of potential matches were found to be false matches and no further investigation was done. It is important to note that this number represents potential matches that the system returns. Further investigation was initiated where matches were believed to be the same person. None of them are considered to be fraud simply because they are returned as potential matches, or even if they are the same person. For example, a person formerly licensed in Washington State may have moved to another state and legally changed their name. Upon later returning to Washington, the person may have applied for a license under their new name and simply neglected to notify DOL of an existing record under a previous name.

Specific data on the number of confirmed matches that required further investigation but did not result in a determination that a person committed a prohibited practice under RCW 46.20.0921 were not collected for this reporting period.

B Of the 1,173 cases where it was determined that a prohibited practice was committed, 319 resulted in a driver’s license suspension. The remaining 854 were not recommended for suspension at this time for one of the following reasons:

- **Identocard fraud** - DOL does not have the authority to take suspension action against a person who commits a prohibited practice relating to Identicards. In lieu of suspension action, a formal notice was mailed to the person requiring that the person submit additional documentation proving identity. Failure to prove identity resulted in the cancellation of the Identocard.
• **The prohibited practice occurred more than 6 years ago** – The statute of limitations for criminal prosecution in a case involving a prohibited practice is six years. Under that basis, DOL does not actively pursue administrative action in a case that is more than six years old.

• **Habitual Traffic Offenders (HTO)** – Since the driving privileges of a person who has been determined to be an HTO (Revoked in the First Degree) are revoked for several years, investigators complete an abbreviated case to document the prohibited practice, but do not recommend further suspension action. The records are combined under the person’s true name and noted as such. This provides a notation on the record that an alias exists.

• **21-year old age-related cases** – if the prohibited practice occurred as a result of a person under the age of 21 attempting to obtain an identity document misrepresenting the person’s age, DOL generally prevents the document from being produced and issued when possible, and sends a letter to the person requiring the person to return the temporary document, or permanent document if it has already been mailed, within 15 days. If the person fails to respond within the 15 days, an investigative report is completed and appropriate administrative action follows.

• **Unable to identify** – If DOL is unable to identify the true identity for the person the document is cancelled rather than suspended.

• **Backlog** – 356 of the 854 fraud cases identified have not been assigned to an investigator at this time as a result of a backlog of cases.

All cases where it was determined that a prohibited practice was committed involving an Enhanced Driver’s License or Identcard (EDL/ID) were referred to law enforcement. For cases that do not involve an EDL/ID, the following criteria are used to determine whether a case should be forwarded to a law enforcement agency:

• Preferably two or more identifiable identity theft victims. The Washington State Patrol (WSP) may pursue charges if there is only one victim, provided WSP finds financial loss.

• Identity theft has occurred within last 6 years where a written application has been submitted.

• A prohibited practice has been determined to have been committed in connection with a Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) application which involves interstate criminal activity.
Under RCW 46.20.0371, the Department of Licensing is required to submit a report to the Governor and the legislature on investigations based on Facial Recognition Matching System (FRMS) results and related data during the previous fiscal year by October 1 of each year. This report is for the fiscal year beginning on July 1, 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total number of potential matches identified by FRMS</td>
<td>185,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Investigations initiated by the department due to FRMS</td>
<td>1,208a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determinations that a person committed a prohibited practice under RCW 46.20.0921</td>
<td>907b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Informal administrative review requested</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Determinations confirmed by informal review</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Determinations that were overturned by an informal review</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Formal hearings requested</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Determinations that were confirmed by a hearings examiner</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Determinations that were overturned by a hearings examiner</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Number of cases where a person declined an informal review or hearing or did not attend a scheduled informal interview or hearing</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Number of determinations that were referred to law enforcement</td>
<td>9c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) All 185,314 potential matches were visually inspected by DOL staff. The vast majority of potential matches were found to be false matches and no further investigation was done. Further investigation was initiated where matches were confirmed to be the same person. It is important to note that this number represents potential matches that the system returns. None of them are considered to be fraud simply because they are returned as potential matches.

Many of the confirmed matches were determined not to involve fraud. For example, a person formerly licensed in Washington state may have moved to another state and legally changed their name due to marriage or other circumstances. Upon later returning to Washington, the person may have applied for a license under their new name and simply neglected to notify DOL of an existing record under a previous name.

Statistics for the number of confirmed matches that required further investigation but did not result in a determination that a person committed a prohibited practice under RCW 46.20.0921 were collected from October 2013 through June 30, 2014.
Disposition of prohibited practices

Of the 907 cases where it was determined that a prohibited practice was committed, 258 resulted in a driver’s license suspension. The remaining 649 were not recommended for suspension at this time for one of the following reasons:

- **Identicard fraud** - DOL does not have the authority to take suspension action against a person who commits a prohibited practice relating to Identicards. In lieu of suspension action, a formal notice was mailed to the person requiring that the person submit additional documentation proving identity. Failure to prove identity resulted in the cancellation of the Identicard.

- **The prohibited practice occurred more than 6 years ago** – The statute of limitations for criminal prosecution in a case involving a prohibited practice is six years. Under that basis, DOL does not actively pursue administrative action in a case that is more than six years old.

- **Habitual Traffic Offenders (HTO)** – Since the driving privileges of a person who has been determined to be an HTO (Revoked in the First Degree) are revoked for several years, investigators complete an abbreviated case to document the prohibited practice, but do not recommend further suspension action. The records are combined under the person’s true name and noted as such. This provides a notation on the record that an alias exists.

- **21-year old age-related cases** – if the prohibited practice occurred as a result of a person under the age of 21 attempting to obtain an identity document misrepresenting the person’s age, DOL generally prevents the document from being produced and issued when possible, and sends a letter to the person requiring the person to return the temporary document, or permanent document if it has already been mailed, within 15 days. If the person fails to respond within the 15 days, an investigative report is completed and appropriate administrative action follows.

- **Unable to identify** – If DOL is unable to identify the true identity for the person the document is cancelled rather than suspended.

- **Backlog** – 456 of the 649 fraud cases identified have not been assigned to an investigator at this time as a result of a backlog of cases.

Nine determinations that a prohibited practice occurred as a result of facial recognition were forwarded to Washington State Patrol (WSP) for law enforcement action.

In all cases where it is determined that a prohibited practice was committed involving an Enhanced Driver’s License or Identicard (EDL/ID), the cases are forwarded to law enforcement. For cases that do not involve an EDL/ID, the following criteria are used to determine whether a specific case should be forwarded to a law enforcement agency:

- Generally two or more identifiable identity theft victims. WSP may pursue charges if there is only one victim, provided there is financial loss.

- Identity theft has occurred within last 6 years where a written application has been submitted.

- A prohibited practice has been determined to have been committed in connection with a Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) application which involves interstate criminal activity.
Facial Recognition Matching System
Annual Report
October 2015
Under RCW 46.20.0371, the Department of Licensing is required to submit a report to the Governor and the legislature on investigations based on Facial Recognition Matching System (FRMS) results and related data during the previous fiscal year by October 1 of each year. This report is for the fiscal year beginning on July 1, 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total number of potential matches identified by FRMS</td>
<td>236,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Investigations initiated by the department due to FRMS</td>
<td>1,183A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determinations that a person committed a prohibited practice under RCW 46.20.0921</td>
<td>705B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Informal administrative review requested</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Determinations confirmed by informal review</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Determinations that were overturned by an informal review</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Formal hearings requested</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Determinations that were confirmed by a hearings examiner</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Determinations that were overturned by a hearings examiner</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Number of cases where a person declined an informal review or did not attend a scheduled informal interview or hearing</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Number of determinations that were referred to law enforcement</td>
<td>10C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A All 236,820 potential matches were visually inspected by DOL staff. The vast majority of potential matches were found to be false matches and no further investigation was done. Further investigation was initiated where matches were confirmed to be the same person. It is important to note that this number represents potential matches that the system returns. None of them are considered to be fraud simply because they are returned as potential matches.

Many of the confirmed matches were determined not to involve fraud. For example, a person formerly licensed in Washington State may have moved to another state and legally changed their name due to marriage or other circumstances. Upon later returning to Washington, the person may have applied for a license under their new name and simply neglected to notify DOL of an existing record under a previous name.

**Disposition of prohibited practices**

B Of the 705 cases where it was determined that a prohibited practice was committed, 144 resulted in a driver’s license suspension. The remaining 561 were not recommended for suspension at this time for one of the following reasons:

- **Identicard fraud** - DOL does not have the authority to take suspension action against a person who commits a prohibited practice relating to Identicards. In lieu of suspension action, a formal notice was mailed to the person requiring that the person submit additional
documentation proving identity. Failure to prove identity resulted in the cancellation of the Identicard.

- **The prohibited practice occurred more than 6 years ago** – The statute of limitations for criminal prosecution in a case involving a prohibited practice is six years. Under that basis, DOL does not actively pursue administrative action in a case that is more than six years old.

- **Habitual Traffic Offenders (HTO)** – Since the driving privileges of a person who has been determined to be an HTO (Revoked in the First Degree) are revoked for several years, investigators complete an abbreviated case to document the prohibited practice, but do not recommend further suspension action. The records are combined under the person’s true name and noted as such. This provides a notation on the record that an alias exists.

- **21-year old age-related cases** – If the prohibited practice occurred as a result of a person under the age of 21 attempting to obtain an identity document misrepresenting the person’s age, DOL generally prevents the document from being produced and issued when possible, and sends a letter to the person requiring the person to return the temporary document, or permanent document if it has already been mailed, within 15 days. If the person fails to respond within the 15 days, an investigative report is completed and appropriate administrative action follows.

- **Unable to identify** – If DOL is unable to identify the true identity for the person the document is cancelled rather than suspended.

- **Backlog** – 354 of the 561 fraud cases identified have not been assigned to an investigator at this time as a result of a backlog of cases.

Ten determinations that a prohibited practice occurred as a result of facial recognition were forwarded to Washington State Patrol (WSP) for law enforcement action.

In all cases where it is determined that a prohibited practice was committed involving an Enhanced Driver’s License or Identicard (EDL/ID), the cases are forwarded to law enforcement. For cases that do not involve an EDL/ID, the following criteria are used to determine whether a specific case should be forwarded to a law enforcement agency:

- Generally two or more identifiable identity theft victims. WSP may pursue charges if there is only one victim, provided there is financial loss.

- Identity theft has occurred within last 6 years where a written application has been submitted.

- A prohibited practice has been determined to have been committed in connection with a Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) application which involves interstate criminal activity.
Facial Recognition Matching System
Annual Report

OCTOBER 2016
Under RCW 46.20.0371, the Department of Licensing is required to submit a report to the Governor and the legislature on investigations based on Facial Recognition Matching System (FRMS) results and related data during the previous fiscal year by October 1 of each year. This report is for the fiscal year beginning on July 1, 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total number of potential matches identified by FRMS</td>
<td>270,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Investigations initiated by the department due to FRMS</td>
<td>1,035&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determinations that a person committed a prohibited practice under RCW 46.20.0921</td>
<td>269&lt;sup&gt;ii&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Informal administrative review requested</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Determinations confirmed by informal review</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Determinations that were overturned by an informal review</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Formal hearings requested</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Determinations that were confirmed by a hearings examiner</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Determinations that were overturned by a hearings examiner</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Number of cases where a person declined an informal review or hearing or did not attend a scheduled informal interview or hearing</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Number of determinations that were referred to law enforcement</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;iii&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>i</sup> All 270,834 potential matches were visually inspected by DOL staff. The vast majority of potential matches were found to be false matches and no further investigation was done. Further investigation was initiated where matches were confirmed to be the same person. It is important to note that this number represents potential matches that the system returns. None of them are considered to be fraud simply because they are returned as potential matches.

Many of the confirmed matches were determined not to involve fraud. For example, a person formerly licensed in Washington State may have moved to another state and legally changed their name due to marriage or other circumstances. Upon later returning to Washington, the person may have applied for a license under their new name and simply neglected to notify DOL of an existing record under a previous name.

**Disposition of prohibited practices**

<sup>ii</sup> Of the 269 cases where it was determined that a prohibited practice was committed, 154 resulted in a driver’s license suspension. The remaining 115 were not recommended for suspension at this time for one of the following reasons:

- **Identocard fraud** – DOL does not have the authority to take suspension action against a person who commits a prohibited practice relating to Identicards. In lieu of suspension action, a formal notice was mailed to the person that the person submit additional documentation proving identity. Failure to prove identity resulted in the cancellation of the Identocard.
• **The prohibited practice occurred more than 6 years ago** – The statute of limitations for criminal prosecution in a case involving a prohibited practice is six years. Under that basis, DOL does not have actively pursue administrative action in a case that is more than six years old.

• **Habitual Traffic Offenders (HTO)** – Since the driving privileges of a person who has been determined to be an HTO (Revoked in the First Degree) are revoked for several years, investigators complete an abbreviated case to document the prohibited practice, but do not recommend further suspension action. The records are combined under the person’s true name and noted as such. This provides a notation on the record that an alias exists.

• **21-year old age-related cases** – if the prohibited practice occurred as a result of a person under the age of 21 attempting to obtain an identity document misrepresenting the person’s age, DOL generally prevents the document from being produced and issued when possible, and sends a letter to the person requiring the person to return the temporary document, or permanent document if it has already been mailed, within 15 days. If the person fails to respond within the 15 days, an investigative report is completed and appropriate administrative action follows.

• **Unable to identify** – If DOL is unable to identify the true identity for the person the document is cancelled rather than suspended.

• **Backlog** – 52 of the 115 fraud cases identified have not been assigned to an investigator at this time as a result of a backlog of cases.

iii Six determinations that a prohibited practice occurred as a result of facial recognition were forwarded to Washington State Patrol (WSP) for law enforcement action.

In all cases where it is determined that a prohibited practice was committed involving an Enhanced Driver’s License or Identcard (EDL/ID), the cases are forwarded to law enforcement. For cases that do not involve an EDL/ID, the following criteria are used to determine whether a specific case should be forwarded to a law enforcement agency:

• Generally two or more identifiable identity theft victims. WSP may pursue charges if there is only one victim, provided there is financial loss.

• Identity theft has occurred within last 6 years where a written application has been submitted.

• A prohibited practice has been determined to have been committed in connection with a Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) application which involves interstate criminal activity.
LIU
LICENSE INTEGRITY UNIT
LIU Staff

- Administrator, Mike Turcott
- Two Supervisors
- Two Support Enforcement Technicians
- Three Investigator 2’s
  - One EDL Investigator
  - Two Vehicle Investigators
- 10 Investigator 1’s
Facial Recognition System

- DOL has used FRS since December of 2007 for enhanced customers. For non-enhanced customers, a pilot project was conducted from October 2010 to June 2011. The agency was given the authority to conduct FRS reviews for all customers in June of 2012.
- Each day, investigators review an average of 600 potential matches.
- DOL did a “Scrub” of their system in 2007 when FRS was implemented, that scrub resulted in 4 million potential matches. Of those, LIU has approximately 245,000 records remaining to review.
The following terms are associated with FRS:

- **Facial Recognition**: a computer application designed to identify potential matches based on a computer algorithm.
- **Template**: a numerical representation of a facial structure used for fast comparison.
- **Probe**: the template to be compared against the database images.
- **Candidate**: a template that matches the probe within set probability limits.
- **Matching Threshold**: the percentage of probable match to the probe that defines a candidate.
Why does DOL use FRS?

- Provides an investigative process to review the photos and determine if a fraud occurred.
- To verify the identity of an applicant or holder of a driver's license.
- To verify the identity of a permit, or identicard.
- To determine whether the person has been issued a driver's license, permit, or identicard under a different name or names.
- To have 1 person on 1 record with 1 identity.
Where do LIU’s Fraud cases originate?

- FRS
- Internal referral (LSR, Out of State Unit, Record Response Unit, etc)
- External agency referral (LE, courts, DMV)
- Victim allegation
- Anonymous tip
Criteria for Priority Assignment

Regardless of the type of case, if it involves:

- A victim
- Three or more identities
- Habitual Traffic Offender (HTO)
- One of the records has a suspended status
- Law enforcement/outside referral
- A 21 year old
- ID card fraud – no driver licenses issued on any of the records involved
Motives of identity fraud

- DUI
- Suspended for other reasons (child support, tickets, failure to appear)
- Identity Theft
- Theft of Public Assistance (DSHS, L&I)
- Theft of SSA benefits
- False claim of US citizenship
- 21 for entry into bars
- Criminal Record
RCW 46.20.037 – Facial Recognition Matching system

(1) The department may implement a facial recognition matching system for drivers' licenses, permits, and identicards. Any facial recognition matching system selected by the department must be used only to verify the identity of an applicant for or holder of a driver's license, permit, or identicard to determine whether the person has been issued a driver's license, permit, or identicard under a different name or names.

(2) Any facial recognition matching system selected by the department must be capable of highly accurate matching, and must be compliant with appropriate standards established by the American association of motor vehicle administrators that exist on June 7, 2012, or such subsequent date as may be provided by the department by rule, consistent with the purposes of this section.

(3) The department shall post notices in conspicuous locations at all department driver licensing offices, make written information available to all applicants at department driver licensing offices, and provide information on the department’s web site regarding the facial recognition matching system. The notices, written information, and information on the web site must address how the facial recognition matching system works, all ways in which the department may use results from the facial recognition matching system, how an investigation based on results from the facial recognition matching system would be conducted, and a person’s right to appeal any determinations made under this chapter.

(4) Results from the facial recognition matching system:

(a) Are not available for public inspection and copying under chapter 42.56 RCW;

(b) May only be disclosed when authorized by a court order;

(c) May only be disclosed to a federal government agency if specifically required under federal law; and

(d) May only be disclosed by the department to a government agency, including a court or law enforcement agency, for use in carrying out its functions if the department has determined that person has committed one of the prohibited practices listed in RCW 46.20.0921 and this determination has been confirmed by a hearings examiner under this chapter or the person declined a hearing or did not attend a scheduled hearing.

(5) All personally identifying information derived from the facial recognition matching system must be stored with appropriate security safeguards. The office of the chief information officer shall develop the appropriate security standards for the department’s use of the facial recognition matching system, subject to approval and oversight by the technology services board.

(6) The department shall develop procedures to handle instances in which the facial recognition matching system fails to verify the identity of an applicant for a renewal or duplicate driver's license, permit, or identicard. These procedures must allow an applicant to prove identity without using the facial recognition matching system.

- Authorizes DOL’s use
- Governs release to outside entities
Helpful Information for Court Order/Search Warrant

- For our purposes, the court order should indicate what type of photo you’re providing i.e. electronic, preexisting DOL photo, etc., that you want ran through FRS. Be sure to include the electronic image or WA DL/IP/ID card information (PIC number) for the subject.

- For the court’s purposes, we’ve seen the below wording:
  - your name/agency requests that the court order be authorized for the purpose of conducting a Facial Recognition query with WA State Dept of Licensing. This query should be used to identify any WA State driver license, instruction permit, identification card images that are similar to the individual pictured in provide information here in accordance with RCW 46.20.037. It is further requested that the information gathered be shared from the Facial Recognition query with your name, therefore, allowing the use and disclosure of the facial recognition matching system in the above cited case per court order.

- Often times the court order needs location information, so for your reference – the FRS system is housed at 1125 Washington ST SE Olympia WA 98507 in the Highways and Licenses Building and is operated by License Integrity Unit staff, Attn: JoAnna Shanafelt or Ashley Palmer. If you want to fax the court order to us, you can at 360-570-1246 or you can email it to fraud@dol.wa.gov and it will be forwarded to us.
Image Upload

- Allows photos to be uploaded into FRS for biometric matches to WA DOL photos
- DOL requires a court order signed by a judge to process a government agency's image upload request (court, federal agency, law enforcement)
- Only .BMP, .JPG, or .PNG are valid file types for image uploads
- Photo must be a straight on image of subject's face
- Quality of image will affect the results populated
Photo examples

- CA DL PHOTO
- BOOKING PHOTO
- WA BLACK AND WHITE
INVESTIGATE

Number can be adjusted by investigator

Min % for candidate match, can be adjusted

Record Details

Image Title: CA BOOKING PHOTO
Description:

- Max Candidates: 30
- Min Threshold: 70

Click here to start investigation

Create Dossier Investigate Back to List
Is LIU able to forward investigations?

- Upon return from Imaging, investigation will be forwarded to SETs to document on LE spreadsheet.
- Spreadsheet is forwarded to specific LE agencies for persuasion.
- Upon request from WSP ITU or any other LE agency and after confirming with administrator, an investigation can be forwarded to assist LE.
- DOL can also release the investigations after due process expires.
LICENSE INTEGRITY UNIT

• QUESTIONS???
CONTACT INFORMATION

- Mailing address:
  PO BOX 9029
  Olympia, WA 98507
  (360) 902-3915

- Email: fraud@dol.wa.gov
LIU Staff

- Administrator, Mike Turcott
- Two Supervisors
- Two Support Enforcement Technicians
- Four Investigator 2’s
  - Two EDL Investigators (One Lead EDL Investigator)
  - Two Vehicle Investigators
- 10 Investigator 1’s
DOL began using the FRS since January 2008 for customers applying for an enhanced document.

DOL did a “Scrub” of their system when FRS was implemented in December 2007. The scrub resulted in 4 million cases of potential matches. Since then, LIU now has approximately 234,000 records remaining to review.

For non enhanced customers, a pilot project was conducted from October 2010- June 2011. The agency was given the authority to conduct FRS reviews for all customers in June of 2012.

Each day, investigators review an average of 600 cases for potential matches.
How it works

AUTOMATED LIST
Probe, 1
Candidates, 2

Probe
82%
57%
77%
15%

Candidates

Stored Templates
The following terms are associated with FRS:

- **Facial Recognition**: a computer application designed to identify potential matches based on a computer algorithm.
- **Template**: a numerical representation of a facial structure used for fast comparison.
- **Probe**: the template used to compare against the other stored templates in the Central Image Server.
- **Candidate**: a template that likely matches the probe within set probability limits.
- **Matching Threshold**: the percentage of probable match to the probe that defines a candidate.
Why does DOL use FRS?

- It is an investigative tool that gives an investigator the basic information they need to make an assessment of a potential match.
- To determine whether the person has been issued a driver's license, permit, or identicard under a different name or names.
- To ensure 1 person has 1 record under 1 identity.
- Allows for data clean up. i.e name changes/customers who go out of state and return to WA under a different name.
Where do LIU’s Fraud cases originate?

- FRS (Daily automated and FRS Scrub)
- Internal referral (LSR, Out of State Unit, Record Response Unit, etc)
- External agency referral (LE, courts, DMV)
- Victim allegation
- Anonymous tip
Criteria for Priority Assignment

Regardless of the type of case, if it involves:

- A victim
- Three or more identities
- Habitual Traffic Offender (HTO)
- One of the records has a suspended status
- Law enforcement/outside referral
- A 21 year old
- ID card fraud – no driver licenses issued on any of the records involved
Motives of identity fraud

- DUI
- Suspended for other reasons (child support, tickets, failure to appear)
- Identity Theft
- Theft of Public Assistance (DSHS, L&I)
- Theft of SSA benefits
- False claim of US citizenship
- 21 for entry into bars
- Criminal Record
RCW 46.20.037 – Facial Recognition Matching system

(1) The department may implement a facial recognition matching system for drivers' licenses, permits, and identicards. Any facial recognition matching system selected by the department must be used only to verify the identity of an applicant for or holder of a driver's license, permit, or identicard to determine whether the person has been issued a driver's license, permit, or identicard under a different name or names.

(2) Any facial recognition matching system selected by the department must be capable of highly accurate matching, and must be compliant with appropriate standards established by the American association of motor vehicle administrators that exist on June 7, 2012, or such subsequent date as may be provided by the department by rule, consistent with the purposes of this section.

(3) The department shall post notices in conspicuous locations at all department driver licensing offices, make written information available to all applicants at department driver licensing offices, and provide information on the department's web site regarding the facial recognition matching system. The notices, written information, and information on the web site must address how the facial recognition matching system works, all ways in which the department may use results from the facial recognition matching system, how an investigation based on results from the facial recognition matching system would be conducted, and a person’s right to appeal any determinations made under this chapter.

(4) Results from the facial recognition matching system:

(a) Are not available for public inspection and copying under chapter 42.56 RCW;

(b) May only be disclosed when authorized by a court order;

(c) May only be disclosed to a federal government agency if specifically required under federal law; and

(d) May only be disclosed by the department to a government agency, including a court or law enforcement agency, for use in carrying out its functions if the department has determined that person has committed one of the prohibited practices listed in RCW 46.20.0921 and this determination has been confirmed by a hearings examiner under this chapter or the person declined a hearing or did not attend a scheduled hearing.

(5) All personally identifying information derived from the facial recognition matching system must be stored with appropriate security safeguards. The office of the chief information officer shall develop the appropriate security standards for the department's use of the facial recognition matching system, subject to approval and oversight by the technology services board.

(6) The department shall develop procedures to handle instances in which the facial recognition matching system fails to verify the identity of an applicant for a renewal or duplicate driver’s license, permit, or identicard. These procedures must allow an applicant to prove identity without using the facial recognition matching system.

- Authorizes DOL’s use
- Governs release to outside entities
For our purposes, the court order should indicate what type of photo you’re providing i.e. electronic, preexisting DOL photo, etc., that you want ran through FRS. Be sure to include the electronic image or WA DL/IP/ID card information (PIC number) for the subject.

For the court’s purposes, we’ve seen the below wording:

- your name/agency requests that the court order be authorized for the purpose of conducting a Facial Recognition query with WA State Dept of Licensing. This query should be used to identify any WA State driver license, instruction permit, identification card images that are similar to the individual pictured in provide information here in accordance with RCW 46.20.037. It is further requested that the information gathered be shared from the Facial Recognition query with your name, therefore, allowing the use and disclosure of the facial recognition matching system in the above cited case per court order.

Often times the court order needs location information, so for your reference – the FRS system is housed at 1125 Washington ST SE Olympia WA 98507 in the Highways and Licenses Building and is operated by License Integrity Unit staff, Attn: JoAnna Shanafelt or Ashley Palmer. If you want to fax the court order to us, you can at 360-570-1246 or you can email it to fraud@dol.wa.gov and it will be forwarded to us.
Image Upload

- Allows photos to be uploaded into FRS for biometric matches to WA DOL photos
- DOL requires a court order signed by a judge to process a government agency’s image upload request (court, federal agency, law enforcement)
- Only .BMP, .JPG, or .PNG are valid file types for image uploads
- Photo must be a straight on image of subject’s face
- Quality of image will affect the results populated
Photo examples

- CA DL PHOTO
- BOOKING PHOTO
- WA BLACK AND WHITE
INVESTIGATE

Number can be adjusted by investigator

Min % for candidate match, can be adjusted

Max Candidates: 30
Min Threshold: 70

Click here to start investigation

Create Dossier  Investigate  Back to List
Image Upload
After LIU conducts an investigation, what next?

- DOL takes administrative suspension and cancellation action as necessary.
- All closed cases are added to a spreadsheet and sent monthly to WSP, Department of State, Department of Labor and Industries, Department of Social and Health Services, Health and Human Services, as well as Social Security Administration for review.
- If cases merit criminal consideration, they are forwarded to WSP, Identity Theft Unit for review.
- Upon request from any law enforcement agency a copy of a closed case where due process has already occurred can be provided.
LICENSE INTEGRITY UNIT

• QUESTIONS???
CONTACT INFORMATION

- Mailing address: PO BOX 9029
  Olympia, WA 98507
  (360) 902-3915

- Email: fraud@dol.wa.gov

- [http://www.dol.wa.gov/driverslicense/externallawenforcement.html](http://www.dol.wa.gov/driverslicense/externallawenforcement.html)
LIU

LICENSE INTEGRITY UNIT
LIU Staff

- Administrator, Mike Turcott
- Two Supervisors
- Two Support Enforcement Technicians
- Four Investigator 2’s
  - Two EDL Investigators (One Lead EDL Investigator)
  - Two Vehicle Investigators
- 10 Investigator 1’s
Facial Recognition System (FRS)

- DOL began using the FRS since January 2008 for customers applying for an enhanced document.

- DOL did a “Scrub” of their system when FRS was implemented in December 2007. The scrub resulted in 4 million cases of potential matches. Since then, LIU now has approximately 234,000 records remaining to review.

- For non enhanced customers, a pilot project was conducted from October 2010- June 2011. The agency was given the authority to conduct FRS reviews for all customers in June of 2012.

- Each day, investigators review an average of 600 cases for potential matches.
The following terms are associated with FRS:

- **Facial Recognition**: a computer application designed to identify potential matches based on a computer algorithm
- **Template**: a numerical representation of a facial structure used for fast comparison
- **Probe**: the template used to compare against the other stored templates in the Central Image Server.
- **Candidate**: a template that likely matches the probe within set probability limits
- **Matching Threshold**: the percentage of probable match to the probe that defines a candidate
How it works

AUTOMATED LIST
Probe, 1
Candidates, 2
Why does DOL use FRS?

- It is an investigative tool that gives an investigator the basic information they need to make an assessment of a potential match.

- To determine whether the person has been issued a driver's license, permit, or identicard under a different name or names.

- To ensure 1 person has 1 record under 1 identity.

- Allows for data clean up. i.e. due to a name change a customer was issued a DL out of state and returned to WA under a different name.
Where do LIU’s Fraud cases originate?

- FRS (Daily automated and FRS Scrub)
- Internal referral (LSR, Out of State Unit, Record Response Unit, etc)
- External agency referral (LE, courts, DMV)
- Victim allegation
- Anonymous tip
Regardless of the type of case, if it involves:

- A victim
- Three or more identities
- Habitual Traffic Offender (HTO)
- One of the records has a suspended status
- Law enforcement/outside referral
- A 21 year old
- ID card fraud – no driver licenses issued on any of the records involved
Motives of identity fraud

- DUI
- Suspended for other reasons (child support, tickets, failure to appear)
- Identity Theft
- Theft of Public Assistance (DSHS, L&I)
- Theft of SSA benefits
- False claim of US citizenship
- 21 for entry into bars
- Criminal Record
RCW’s

- RCW 46.20.0921 – Violations and penalty
  - 1a-1f

  *Most commonly cited by LIU*
  1e: It is a misdemeanor for any person - To use a false or fictitious name in any application for a driver's license or identicard or to knowingly make a false statement or to knowingly conceal a material fact or otherwise commit a fraud in any such application

- RCW 46.20.037 – Facial Recognition Matching system
  - Authorizes DOL’s use
  - Governs release to outside entities
INVESTIGATIVE ISSUES

- If a response is not recorded on an application for issuance, the system is programmed to interpret that response as “no.”
  - LIU therefore does not rely heavily on the yes/no fields of the application. *i.e. Have you had a driver license before? Are you a twin or triplet?*
- The Social Security Online Verification System is not perfect. The SSOLV system will return a match for a similar name and date of birth. LIU’s practice was to contact the Social Security Administration and verify the match, however, effective April 2013, SSA quit providing that service for DOL.
  - LIU therefore has no way of knowing if the match on record is a true match for the exact name and dob on DOL’s files.
- DOL does not require documents presented for proof of identity to be scanned and maintained in a DOL database (with the exception of enhanced customers).
  - LIU has no way of knowing if those documents were presented or if the corresponding certificate numbers were entered correctly, and relies heavily on the Licensing Service Representatives data entry and issuance integrity.
- LIU views each issuance as an application, whether or not an actual application was filled out at time of issuance. However, there is debate concerning the term “application.”
  - LIU has received AAG interpretation in the past which is consistent with our business practice.
- LIU investigators are not law enforcement.
  - As a result, items such as booking photos may be difficult to obtain.
- LIU does not have reliable tools to accurately identify the true identity of the subject, especially, when they have multiple aliases.
  - LIU typically goes off of first issued, Department of Homeland Security information, documents provided as proof of identity and customer statements.
- DOL does not have a statute of limitations relating to administrative action for fraud.
  - If fraud has not occurred in over six years, LIU will not proceed with administrative action.
  - When law enforcement is forwarded cases or inquires about past cases, our cases may not be relevant as they are passed the criminal statute of limitations.
- Outside agencies do not always have an interest in our cases.
  - SSA – if SSN’s are already cross-referenced or customer is not receiving dual benefits.
  - DSHS/L&I – if customer is entitled to benefits, DSHS is not concerned the identity they are receiving benefits under.
Frequently Asked Questions

How does LIU differentiate between twins?
- LIU compares:
  - Photographs (moles, scars, distinct marks, facial features)
  - Signatures
  - Drive Record
  - Office used
  - Dates issued
  - Twin/Triplet indicator on application

Why does FRS not differentiate between race and gender?
- FRS is designed to map points on the face and create a template of that mapping, race and gender are not factors in mapping.

Why are cases not immediately assigned to an investigator?
- LIU has a backlog of 3,800 FRS related cases
  - 1,729 of those are daily automated cases
  - 2,071 of those are scrub cases

Why does LIU recommend 364 day suspension for every fraud case?
- In 2008, LIU Administrator implemented the 364 day suspension for all fraud cases for consistency purposes.

Why was the threshold in FRS set at a certain threshold?
- The threshold has changed over the years as the business needs have changed based on staffing levels and numbers of frauds identified. In 2007, when LIU started doing FRS on enhanced customers the threshold was set at 72% and the threshold has increased over the years. The current daily and scrub threshold is set at 74.1% which seems to catch the majority of our frauds.

Why does LIU not conduct in person interviews on every case?
- LIU does not conduct in person interviews in every case for a number of factors: time, safety, coordination efforts, many of the respondents admit to fraud and provide a statement to that fact, and the case has already been proven beyond a preponderance of evidence that fraud has occurred.
Levels of Review

- Identify fraud
- Forward information, including photos, to supervisor for review
- Supervisor reviews and assigns to an investigator to investigate
- Investigator assigned case for further review and possible administrative action
- Case is peer-reviewed, reviewed by the lead investigator II, and then reviewed and approved by the supervisor before final signature and approval of administrative action
After LIU conducts an investigation, what next?

- DOL takes administrative suspension and cancellation action as necessary.
- All closed cases are added to a spreadsheet and sent monthly to WSP, Department of State, Department of Labor and Industries, Department of Social and Health Services, Health and Human Services, as well as Social Security Administration for review.
- If cases merit criminal consideration, they are forwarded to WSP, Identity Theft Unit for review.
- Upon request from any law enforcement agency a copy of a closed case where due process has already occurred can be provided.
CONTACT INFORMATION

- Mailing address:
  PO BOX 9029
  Olympia, WA 98507
  (360) 902-3915 (Message Line)
  Fax (360) 570-1246

  JoAnna Shanafelt, Investigator IV
  (360) 902-3715
  jshanafelt@dol.wa.gov

  Ashley Palmer, Investigator III
  (360) 902-3702
  apalmer@dol.wa.gov

- Email: fraud@dol.wa.gov
• QUESTIONS????
License Integrity Unit

Identity Theft Victim Response
LIU Staff

- Administrator
- Two Supervisors
- Three Investigator 2’s
  - One EDL Investigator
  - Two Vehicle Investigators
- Ten Investigator 1’s
- Two Support Enforcement Technicians
Facial Recognition System

- Used since December 2007 for EDL customers
- Pilot project for non-EDL customers October 2010-June 2011.
- FRS used for all issuances since June 2012.
  - RCW 46.20.037
- Average of 750 daily automated FRS reviews.
- Approximately 246,000 records remaining to review in the FRS scrub database.
Vocabulary

- **Facial Recognition**: a computer application designed to identify potential matches based on a computer algorithm.
- **Identify Theft**: When someone steals your personal information and uses it without your permission.
Motives for identity fraud

- DUI
- Suspended for other reasons (child support, tickets, failure to appear)
- Identity Theft
- Theft of Public Assistance (DSHS, L&I)
- Theft of SSA benefits
- False claim of US citizenship
- 21 for entry into bars
- Criminal Record
How it works

AUTOMATED LIST
Probe, 1
Candidates, 2
Criteria for Priority Assignment

Regardless of the type of case, if it involves:

- A victim
- Three or more identities
- A 21 year old
- ID card fraud – no driver licenses issued on any of the records involved
- Habitual Traffic Offender (HTO)
- Law enforcement/outside referral
Where do LIU’s Fraud cases originate?

- FRS daily automated
- FRS scrub
- Internal referral (LSR, Out of State Unit, Record Response Unit, etc)
- External agency referral (LE, courts, DMV)
- Victim allegation
- Anonymous tip
Procedure

- RECEIVE REQUEST/INQUIRY-EXAMPLES INCLUDE:
  a. Request to flag record
  b. Inquiry on obtaining new number of alternate pic
  c. Inquiry on potential fraud on record.

ASSESS SITUATION WHILE REVIEWING RECORD
License Integrity Unit
Contact Info

(360) 902-3915
(360) 902-1246 fax
fraud@dol.wa.gov
LIU Staff

- Administrator
- Two Supervisors
- Two Support Enforcement Technicians
- Three Investigator 2’s
  - One EDL Investigator
  - Two Vehicle Investigators
- 10 Investigator 1’s
- 2 Investigator 1 non-permanent positions
The following terms are associated with FRS:

- **Facial Recognition**: a computer application designed to identify potential matches based on a computer algorithm
- **Template**: a numerical representation of a facial structure used for fast comparison
- **Probe**: the template to be compared against the database images
- **Candidate**: a template that matches the probe within set probability limits
- **Matching Threshold**: the percentage of probable match to the probe that defines a candidate
- **Automated List**: a biometric matching system where LIU investigators compare photos of customers to help detect identity fraud
- **Scrub List**: a list of records ran through the one-to-many biometric process at different points in time
Facial Recognition System

- FRS has been used by DOL since December of 2007 for enhanced customers. For non-enhanced customers, a pilot project was conducted from October 2010 to June 2011. The agency was given the authority to conduct FRS reviews for all customers in June of 2012.
- Since January of 2013, LIU has conducted over 103,600 daily automated FRS reviews.
- LIU has approximately 270,000 records remaining to review in the FRS scrub database.
Daily Automated Reviews
- Issuances are “live”
- Temporary/permanent denials
- Comments added to record
- Formal Notices mailed at time of discovery
- Case file created for investigation
- Added to backlog of cases or assigned dependant on priority level

Scrub Reviews
- Photos are old (prev. issuances)
- No denials
- Comments not added to record; only on in house database
  - Unless record is up for renewal within 6 months
- Formal Notices mailed at time of discovery
- Moved to Common List
- Non-priority cases
Regardless of the type of case, if it involves:

- A victim
- Three or more identities
- A 21 year old
- ID card fraud – no driver licenses issued on any of the records involved
- Habitual Traffic Offender (HTO)
- Law enforcement/outside referral
Where do LIU’s Fraud cases originate?

- FRS daily automated
- FRS scrub
- Internal referral (LSR, Out of State Unit, Record Response Unit, etc)
- External agency referral (LE, courts, DMV)
- Victim allegation
- Anonymous tip
Motives of identity fraud

- DUI
- Suspended for other reasons (child support, tickets, failure to appear)
- Identity Theft
- Theft of Public Assistance (DSHS, L&I)
- Theft of SSA benefits
- False claim of US citizenship
- 21 for entry into bars
- Criminal Record
RCW 46.20.037 – Facial Recognition Matching system

(1) The department may implement a facial recognition matching system for drivers' licenses, permits, and identicards. Any facial recognition matching system selected by the department must be used only to verify the identity of an applicant for or holder of a driver's license, permit, or identicard to determine whether the person has been issued a driver's license, permit, or identicard under a different name or names.

(2) Any facial recognition matching system selected by the department must be capable of highly accurate matching, and must be compliant with appropriate standards established by the American association of motor vehicle administrators that exist on June 7, 2012, or such subsequent date as may be provided by the department by rule, consistent with the purposes of this section.

(3) The department shall post notices in conspicuous locations at all department driver licensing offices, make written information available to all applicants at department driver licensing offices, and provide information on the department’s web site regarding the facial recognition matching system. The notices, written information, and information on the web site must address how the facial recognition matching system works, all ways in which the department may use results from the facial recognition matching system, how an investigation based on results from the facial recognition matching system would be conducted, and a person’s right to appeal any determinations made under this chapter.

(4) Results from the facial recognition matching system:

(a) Are not available for public inspection and copying under chapter 42.56 RCW;

(b) May only be disclosed when authorized by a court order;

(c) May only be disclosed to a federal government agency if specifically required under federal law; and

(d) May only be disclosed by the department to a government agency, including a court or law enforcement agency, for use in carrying out its functions if the department has determined that person has committed one of the prohibited practices listed in RCW 46.20.0921 and this determination has been confirmed by a hearings examiner under this chapter or the person declined a hearing or did not attend a scheduled hearing.

(5) All personally identifying information derived from the facial recognition matching system must be stored with appropriate security safeguards. The office of the chief information officer shall develop the appropriate security standards for the department's use of the facial recognition matching system, subject to approval and oversight by the technology services board.

(6) The department shall develop procedures to handle instances in which the facial recognition matching system fails to verify the identity of an applicant for a renewal or duplicate driver's license, permit, or identicard. These procedures must allow an applicant to prove identity without using the facial recognition matching system.

- Authorizes DOL’s use
- Governs release to outside entities
Helpful Information for Court Order

- For our purposes, the court order should indicate what type of photo you’re providing i.e. electronic, preexisting DOL photo, etc., that you want ran through FRS. Be sure to include the electronic image or WA DL/IP/ID card information (PIC number) for the subject.

- For the court’s purposes, we’ve seen the below wording:
  - [your name/agency] requests that the court order be authorized for the purpose of conducting a Facial Recognition query with WA State Dept of Licensing. This query should be used to identify any WA State driver license, instruction permit, identification card images that are similar to the individual pictured in provide information here in accordance with RCW 46.20.037. It is further requested that the information gathered be shared from the Facial Recognition query with your name, therefore, allowing the use and disclosure of the facial recognition matching system in the above cited case per court order.

- Often times the court order needs location information, so for your reference – the FRS system is housed at 1125 Washington ST SE Olympia WA 98507 in the Highways and Licenses Building and is operated by License Integrity Unit staff, Attn: JoAnna Shanafelt or Ashley Palmer. If you want to fax the court order to us, you can at 360-570-1246 or you can email it to fraud@dol.wa.gov and it will be forwarded to us.
Image Upload

- Allows photos to be uploaded into FRS for biometric matches to WA DOL photos
- DOL requires a court order signed by a judge to process a government agency’s image upload request (court, federal agency, law enforcement)
- Only .BMP, .JPG, or .PNG are valid file types for image uploads
- Photo must be a straight on image of subject’s face
- Quality of image will affect the results populated
INVESTIGATE

Number can be adjusted by investigator

Min % for candidate match, can be adjusted

Record Details

Image Title: CA BOOKING PHOTO
Description:

Max Candidates: 30
Min Threshold: 70

Create Dossier Investigate Back to List

Click here to start investigation
Image Upload
Frequently Asked Questions

How does LIU differentiate between twins?
- LIU compares:
  - Photographs (moles, scars, distinct marks, facial features)
  - Signatures
  - Drive Record
  - Office used
  - Dates issued
  - Twin/Triplet indicator on application

Why does FRS not differentiate between race and gender?
- FRS is designed to map points on the face and create a template of that mapping, race and gender are not factors in mapping.

Why was the threshold in FRS set at a certain threshold?
- The threshold has changed over the years as the business needs have changed based on staffing levels and numbers of frauds identified. In 2007, when LIU started doing FRS on enhanced customers the threshold was set at 72% and the threshold has increased over the years. The current daily and scrub threshold is set at 74.1% which seems to catch the majority of our frauds.

What kind of action is LIU authorized to take?
- Administrative action only
LICENSE INTEGRITY UNIT

• QUESTIONS???
CONTACT INFORMATION

- Mailing address:
  PO BOX 9029
  Olympia, WA 98507
  (360) 902-3915

- Email: fraud@dol.wa.gov
LIU Staff

- Administrator
- Two Supervisors
- Two Support Enforcement Technicians
- Three Investigator 2’s
  - One EDL Investigator
  - Two Vehicle Investigators
- 10 Investigator 1’s
- 2 Investigator 1 non-permanent positions
Vocabulary

- The following terms are associated with FRS:
  - **Facial Recognition**: a computer application designed to identify potential matches based on a computer algorithm
  - **Template**: a numerical representation of a facial structure used for fast comparison
  - **Probe**: the template to be compared against the database images
  - **Candidate**: a template that matches the probe within set probability limits
  - **Matching Threshold**: the percentage of probable match to the probe that defines a candidate
  - **Automated List**: a biometric matching system where LIU investigators compare photos of customers to help detect identity fraud
  - **Scrub List**: a list of records ran through the one to many biometric process at different points in time
Facial Recognition System

- FRS has been used by DOL since December of 2007 for enhanced customers. For non enhanced customers, a pilot project was conducted from October 2010 - June 2011. The agency was given the authority to conduct FRS reviews for all customers in June of 2012.
- Since January of 2013, LIU has conducted over 103,600 daily automated FRS reviews.
- LIU has approximately 270,000 records remaining to review in the FRS scrub database.
How it works

AUTOMATED LIST
Probe, 1
Candidates, 2
**Daily Automated Reviews**
- Issuances are “live”
- Temporary/permanent denials
- Comments added to record
- Formal Notices mailed at time of discovery
- Case file created for investigation
- Added to backlog of cases or assigned dependant on priority level

**Scrub Reviews**
- Photos are old (prev. issuances)
- No denials
- Comments not added to record; only on in house database
  - Unless record is up for renewal within 6 months
- Formal Notices mailed at time of discovery
- Moved to Common List
- Non-priority cases
Criteria for Priority Assignment

Regardless of the type of case, if it involves:
- A victim
- Three or more identities
- A 21 year old
- ID card fraud – no driver licenses issued on any of the records involved
- Habitual Traffic Offender (HTO)
- Law enforcement/outside referral
Where do LIU’s Fraud cases originate?

- FRS daily automated
- FRS scrub
- Internal referral (LSR, Out of State Unit, Record Response Unit, etc)
- External agency referral (LE, courts, DMV)
- Victim allegation
- Anonymous tip
Motives of identity fraud

- DUI
- Suspended for other reasons (child support, tickets, failure to appear)
- Identity Theft
- Theft of Public Assistance (DSHS, L&I)
- Theft of SSA benefits
- False claim of US citizenship
- 21 for entry into bars
- Criminal Record
RCW 46.20.037 – Facial Recognition Matching system

(1) The department may implement a facial recognition matching system for drivers’ licenses, permits, and identicards. Any facial recognition matching system selected by the department must be used only to verify the identity of an applicant for or holder of a driver’s license, permit, or identicard to determine whether the person has been issued a driver’s license, permit, or identicard under a different name or names.

(2) Any facial recognition matching system selected by the department must be capable of highly accurate matching, and must be compliant with appropriate standards established by the American association of motor vehicle administrators that exist on June 7, 2012, or such subsequent date as may be provided by the department by rule, consistent with the purposes of this section.

(3) The department shall post notices in conspicuous locations at all department driver licensing offices, make written information available to all applicants at department driver licensing offices, and provide information on the department’s web site regarding the facial recognition matching system. The notices, written information, and information on the web site must address how the facial recognition matching system works, all ways in which the department may use results from the facial recognition matching system, how an investigation based on results from the facial recognition matching system would be conducted, and a person’s right to appeal any determinations made under this chapter.

(4) Results from the facial recognition matching system:

(a) Are not available for public inspection and copying under chapter 42.56 RCW;

(b) May only be disclosed when authorized by a court order;

(c) May only be disclosed to a federal government agency if specifically required under federal law; and

(d) May only be disclosed by the department to a government agency, including a court or law enforcement agency, for use in carrying out its functions if the department has determined that person has committed one of the prohibited practices listed in RCW 46.20.0921 and this determination has been confirmed by a hearings examiner under this chapter or the person declined a hearing or did not attend a scheduled hearing.

(5) All personally identifying information derived from the facial recognition matching system must be stored with appropriate security safeguards. The office of the chief information officer shall develop the appropriate security standards for the department’s use of the facial recognition matching system, subject to approval and oversight by the technology services board.

(6) The department shall develop procedures to handle instances in which the facial recognition matching system fails to verify the identity of an applicant for a renewal or duplicate driver’s license, permit, or identicard. These procedures must allow an applicant to prove identity without using the facial recognition matching system.

- Authorizes DOL’s use
- Governs release to outside entities
Helpful Information for Court Order

- For our purposes, the court order should indicate what type of photo you’re providing i.e. electronic, preexisting DOL photo, etc., that you want ran through FRS. Be sure to include the electronic image or WA DL/IP/ID card information (PIC number) for the subject.

- For the court’s purposes, we’ve seen the below wording:
  - *your name/agency requests that the court order be authorized for the purpose of conducting a Facial Recognition query with WA State Dept of Licensing. This query should be used to identify any WA State driver license, instruction permit, identification card images that are similar to the individual pictured in provide information here in accordance with RCW 46.20.037. It is further requested that the information gathered be shared from the Facial Recognition query with your name, therefore, allowing the use and disclosure of the facial recognition matching system in the above cited case per court order.*

- Often times the court order needs location information, so for your reference – the FRS system is housed at 1125 Washington ST SE Olympia WA 98507 in the Highways and Licenses Building and is operated by License Integrity Unit staff, Attn: JoAnna Shanafelt or Ashley Palmer. If you want to fax the court order to us, you can at 360-570-1246 or you can email it to fraud@dol.wa.gov and it will be forwarded to us.
Image Upload

- Allows photos to be uploaded into FRS for biometric matches to WA DOL photos
- DOL requires a court order signed by a judge to process a government agency's image upload request (court, federal agency, law enforcement)
- Only .BMP, .JPG, or .PNG are valid file types for image uploads
- Photo must be a straight on image of subject’s face
- Quality of image will affect the results populated
Photo examples

CA DL PHOTO  BOOKING PHOTO  WA BLACK AND WHITE
INVESTIGATE

Number can be adjusted by investigator

Min % for candidate match, can be adjusted

Max Candidates: 30
Min Threshold: 70

Click here to start investigation
Image Upload
Frequently Asked Questions

How does LIU differentiate between twins?
- LIU compares:
  - Photographs (moles, scars, distinct marks, facial features)
  - Signatures
  - Drive Record
  - Office used
  - Dates issued
  - Twin/Triplet indicator on application

Why does FRS not differentiate between race and gender?
- FRS is designed to map points on the face and create a template of that mapping, race and gender are not factors in mapping.

Why was the threshold in FRS set at a certain threshold?
- The threshold has changed over the years as the business needs have changed based on staffing levels and numbers of frauds identified. In 2007, when LIU started doing FRS on enhanced customers the threshold was set at 72% and the threshold has increased over the years. The current daily and scrub threshold is set at 74.1% which seems to catch the majority of our frauds.

What kind of action is LIU authorized to take?
- Administrative action only
LICENSE INTEGRITY UNIT

• QUESTIONS?????
CONTACT INFORMATION

- Mailing address:
  PO BOX 9029
  Olympia, WA 98507
  (360) 902-3915

- Email: fraud@dol.wa.gov
License Integrity Unit

Facial Recognition System
LIU Staff

- Administrator
- Two Supervisors
- Three Investigator 2’s
  - One EDL Investigator
  - Two Vehicle Investigators
- Ten Investigator 1’s
- Two Support Enforcement Technicians
Vocabulary

- **Facial Recognition**: a computer application designed to identify potential matches based on a computer algorithm.
- **Template**: a numerical representation of a facial structure used for fast comparison.
- **Probe**: the subject template to be compared against the database images.
- **Candidate**: a template in the database that matches the probe within set probability limits.
- **Matching Threshold**: the percentage of probable match to the probe that defines a candidate.
- **Automated List**: a biometric matching system where LIU investigators compare photos of customers to help detect identity fraud.
- **Scrub List**: a list of records ran through the “one-to-many” biometric process at different points in time.
Facial Recognition System

- Used since December 2007 for EDL customers
- Pilot project for non-EDL customers October 2010-June 2011.
- FRS used for all issuances since June 2012.
  - RCW 46.20.037
- Over 103,600 daily automated FRS reviews since January 2011
- Approximately 265,000 records remaining to review in the FRS scrub database.
How it works

AUTOMATED LIST
Probe, 1
Candidates, 2

Probe

15% 77% 57% 82%
Daily Automated Reviews vs. Scrub Reviews

**Daily Automated Reviews**
- Issuances are “live”
- Temporary/permanent denials
- Comments added to record
- Formal Notices mailed at time of discovery
- Case file created for investigation
- Added to backlog of cases or assigned dependant on priority level

**Scrub Reviews**
- Photos are old (prev. issuances)
- No denials
- Comments not added to record; only on in house database
  - Unless record is up for renewal within 6 months
- Formal Notices mailed at time of discovery
- Moved to Common List
- Non-priority cases
Criteria for Priority Assignment

Regardless of the type of case, if it involves:

- A victim
- Three or more identities
- A 21 year old
- ID card fraud – no driver licenses issued on any of the records involved
- Habitual Traffic Offender (HTO)
- Law enforcement/outside referral
Where do LIU’s Fraud cases originate?

- FRS daily automated
- FRS scrub
- Internal referral (LSR, Out of State Unit, Record Response Unit, etc)
- External agency referral (LE, courts, DMV)
- Victim allegation
- Anonymous tip
Motives for identity fraud

- DUI
- Suspended for other reasons (child support, tickets, failure to appear)
- Identity Theft
- Theft of Public Assistance (DSHS, L&I)
- Theft of SSA benefits
- False claim of US citizenship
- 21 for entry into bars
- Criminal Record
RCW 46.20.037

- Authorizes Facial Recognition System for fraud detection
- Specifies technical standards (AAMVA) and security safeguards
- Requires notice to applicants warning of FRS scan
- Exempts results from public disclosure
- Limits dissemination to law enforcement
Image Upload

- Allows photos to be uploaded into FRS for biometric matches to WA DOL photos
- RCW 46.20.037 requires a court order to process a government agency’s image upload request
- Only .BMP, .JPG, or .PNG are valid file types for image uploads
- Photo must be a straight on image of subject’s face
- Quality of image will affect the results populated
Helpful Information for Court Order (Search Warrant)

- **Description of evidence sought:**
  
  “A facial recognition query to identify any Washington state driver license, instruction permit, or identification card images similar to the individual pictured in the photographs submitted, in accordance with RCW 46.20.037”

- **Location of evidence:**
  
  Washington Department of Licensing Facial Recognition Database  
  1125 Washington Street SE  
  Olympia, WA 98507  
  Attn: JoAnna Shanafelt or Ashley Palmer

- **Helpful to indicate what type of photo you are submitting for FRS search and to include the subject’s PIC**
INVESTIGATE

CAN BE ADJUSTED BY THE INVESTIGATOR

CAN BE ADJUSTED BY THE INVESTIGATOR

CLICK HERE TO START INVESTIGATION

Max Candidates: 30
Min Threshold: 70

Create Dossier  Investigate  Back to List
Image Upload
Frequently Asked Questions

How does LIU differentiate between twins?
- Photographs (moles, scars, distinct marks, facial features)
- Signatures
- Drive Record
- Office used
- Dates issued
- Twin/Triplet indicator on application

Why does FRS not differentiate between race and gender?
- The FRS template maps points on the face with no regard to race or gender

How is the FRS matching threshold determined?
- The threshold has been adjusted up to 74.1% based on business needs, staffing levels and numbers of frauds identified.

What kind of action is LIU authorized to take?
- Administrative action only (cancellations and suspensions)
License Integrity Unit
Contact Info

(360) 902-3915
(360) 902-1246 fax
fraud@dol.wa.gov
HANDLING FRAUDS FOUND IN FRS

When you find a possible fraud, go to the “move to” drop down box, select “research” and click on the “move to” button. Note: You may want to write down the PIC before moving or use “cut and paste”, to make it easier to find in the “Cases” tab.

Go to the “Cases” tab and open the record you just moved to “research.” (You may have to filter by PIC or Case ID # to find the record) Use the “assign to” drop down, select your name and click on the “assign to” button. By assigning the case to yourself, another investigator may not make changes or complete your record.

Return to the “Leads” tab and continue your daily processing. When ready to investigate the record further, open the “Cases” tab and open the record assigned to you.

Conduct your research as appropriate, using the Checklist of Daily Automated Reviews and make your entry in the notes by clicking the notepad icon next to your probe photo.

If you determine there is no fraud involved, enter note: no match, click on the “Clear - No Issues.”

If there is fraud, enter your notes and click on the Candidate photo that corresponds to the fraud involving your probe. Click “Create Dossier” button above the probe picture to generate the photo and notes page to print out for your paper file.

Note: Do not use the “Create Dossier” button beside either photo.

Towards the left side of the screen, click on the “Case Dossier” button to create a view of the entire gallery to print for your case file.
Note: You will need to print two separate dossiers. Select the public notes, and include score boxes on the pop up screen.

If the probe photo is the true identity and OK to send to the customer, "Clear – No Issues."

If you need additional time to determine if there is fraud, email the Lead Investigator II or supervisor and request the issuance be placed on temporary denial. After you have reviewed the record further and determined there was no fraud, send a second email to the Lead Investigator II or supervisor and request the issuance be removed from temporary denial and complete the record in FRS by clicking "Clear – No Issues."

If you determined the record is a fraudulent issuance, send an email to the Lead Investigator II or supervisor, ask the record be changed to permanent denial and follow directions above to create your paper case file.

Check Photo Verification the next day and when it shows "Biometric Fraud", open the record in the “Cases” tab and click, “Clear – No Issues". (Once the biometric fraud is on, the issuance will be stopped by gated issuance and will not be produced or mailed) By clicking on the "Clear – No Issues", the case is removed from an individual investigator's list and shows that the research has been completed.

At this time, LIU is using a limited number of the features in FRS and is not using the case management features.
LIU

LICENSE INTEGRITY UNIT
LIU Staff

- Administrator, Glenn Ball
- Two Supervisors
- Two Support Enforcement Technicians
- Five Driver/Vehicle Investigator 2’s
  - 1 Lead
- 10 Investigator 1’s
How it works

LEADS LIST
Probe
Candidates, 2

Scores
.98
.95
.94
.99

Stored Templates
Facial Recognition System

- **December 2007**: FRS used on enhanced issuances only.
- **2007**: Scrub of system, resulted 4 million potential matches. Since the scrub, we have gradually worked our way through the reviews of the 4 million records.
- **October 2010-June 2011**: Pilot project on all issuances.
- **June 2012**: DOL given authority to use FRS on all issuances.
- **December 2014**: Received an upgraded system.
Where do LIU’s Fraud cases originate?

- FRS
- Internal referral (LSR, Out of State Unit, Record Response Unit, Vehicle Licensing Offices, etc)
- External agency referral (LE, courts, DMV)
- Victim allegation
- Anonymous tip
Criteria for Priority Assignment

- A victim
- Three or more identities
- Habitual Traffic Offender (HTO)
- A suspended/revoked record
- Law enforcement/outside referral
- A 21 year old
- ID card fraud – no driver licenses issued on any of the records involved

This is the result of a 2,700 case backlog.
Motives of identity fraud

- DUI
- Suspended for other reasons (child support, tickets, failure to appear)
- Identity Theft
- Theft of Public Assistance (DSHS, L&I)
- Theft of SSA benefits
- False claim of US citizenship
- 21 for entry into bars
- Criminal Record
RCW 46.20.037 – Facial Recognition Matching system

- Authorizes DOL’s use
- Governs release to outside entities
  - The release requires a court order
Helpful Information for Court Order/Search Warrant

- For our purposes, the court order should indicate what type of photo you’re providing i.e. electronic, preexisting DOL photo, etc., that you want ran through FRS. Be sure to include the electronic image or WA DL/IP/ID card information (PIC number) for the subject.

- For the court’s purposes, we’ve seen the below wording:
  - your name/agency requests that the court order be authorized for the purpose of conducting a Facial Recognition query with WA State Dept of Licensing. This query should be used to identify any WA State driver license, instruction permit, identification card images that are similar to the individual pictured in provide information here in accordance with RCW 46.20.037. It is further requested that the information gathered be shared from the Facial Recognition query with your name, therefore, allowing the use and disclosure of the facial recognition matching system in the above cited case per court order.

- Often times the court order needs location information, so for your reference – the FRS system is housed at 1125 Washington ST SE Olympia WA 98507 in the Highways and Licenses Building and is operated by License Integrity Unit staff, Attn: JoAnna Shanafelt or Ashley Palmer. If you want to fax the court order to us, you can at 360-570-1246 or you can email it to fraud@dol.wa.gov and it will be forwarded to us.
Image Upload

- Allows photos to be uploaded into FRS for biometric matches to WA DOL photos
- DOL requires a court order signed by a judge to process a government agency’s image upload request (court, federal agency, law enforcement)
- Only .BMP, .JPG, or .PNG are valid file types for image uploads
- Photo must be a straight on image of subject’s face
- Quality of image will affect the results populated
- Seattle Police Department and Pierce County Sheriff’s Office have their own FRS.
Photo examples

- CA DL PHOTO
- BOOKING PHOTO
- WA BLACK AND WHITE
Candidate number can be adjusted by investigator.

1:N (Many) – Identification is the process of comparing the image template for one person (the Probe) to the image templates of every other person in the FRS database. If a closeness match is found a case is created.

Click here to start investigation.
QUESTIONS????
Mailing address:
PO BOX 9029
Olympia, WA 98507
(360) 902-3915

Email: fraud@dol.wa.gov

http://www.dol.wa.gov/driverslicense/externallawenforcement.html
DOL DIVISIONS

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS
HUMAN RESOURCES
INFORMATION SERVICES
CUSTOMER RELATIONS
PROGRAMS AND SERVICES
LIU Team

- Administrator, Glenn Ball
- Assistant Administrator/Manager
- Two Supervisors
- Two Support Enforcement Technicians
- One Customer Service Specialist 2
- Five Driver/Vehicle Investigator 2’s
  - 2 Enhanced Driver License
- 10 Investigator 1’s
SERVICES

- Driver license, Identification card photographs and applications for issuance
- Montages
- Vehicle inquires and transaction documents
- Facial Recognition Queries
- Driver and Vehicle Investigative assistance
- Undercover driver licenses and identification cards
LIU Investigates

- Vehicle license/title fraud
  - Vehicle theft
  - Avoid transportation district taxes or emission testing
- Subagent misconduct
  - Accepting questionable or fraudulent documents
- Address fraud
  - Non residents seeking or obtaining a Washington driver license
- Identity theft/Multiple identities
Has someone stolen your face?
Where do LIU’s Fraud cases originate?

- FRS
- Internal referral (LSR, Out of State Unit, Record Response Unit, Vehicle Licensing Offices, etc)
- External agency referral (LE, courts, DMV)
- Victim allegation
- Anonymous tip
Criteria for Priority Assignment

- A victim
- Three or more identities
- Habitual Traffic Offender (HTO)
- A suspended/revoked record
- Law enforcement/outside referral
- A 21 year old
- ID card fraud – no driver licenses issued on any of the records involved

This is the result of a 2,700 case backlog.
Motives of identity fraud

- DUI
- Suspended for other reasons (child support, tickets, failure to appear)
- Identity Theft
- Theft of Public Assistance (DSHS, L&I)
- Theft of SSA benefits
- False claim of US citizenship
- 21 for entry into bars
- Criminal Record
Facial Recognition System

- **December 2007**: FRS used on enhanced issuances only.
- Scrubbed the system, resulting in 4 million potential matches. Since the scrub, we have gradually worked our way through the reviews of the 4 million records.
- **October 2010-June 2011**: Pilot project on all issuances.
- **June 2012**: DOL given authority to use FRS on all issuances.
- **December 2014**: Received an upgraded system.
RCW 46.20.037 – Facial Recognition Matching system

- Authorizes DOL’s use
- Governs release to outside entities
  - The release requires a court order
How FRS works

LEADS LIST
Probe
Candidates, 2
Daily Issuance / One to One
Daily Review / One to many
Image Upload

- Allows photos to be uploaded into FRS for biometric matches to WA DOL photos
- DOL requires a court order signed by a judge to process a government agency’s image upload request (court, federal agency, law enforcement)
- Only .BMP, .JPG, or .PNG are valid file types for image uploads
- Photo must be a straight on image of subject’s face
- Quality of image will affect the results populated
- Seattle Police Department and Pierce County Sheriff’s Office have their own FRS.
Photo examples

CA DL PHOTO

BOOKING PHOTO

WA BLACK AND WHITE
INVESTIGATE

Candidate number can be adjusted by investigator.

1:N (Many) – Identification is the process of comparing the image template for one person (the Probe) to the image templates of every other person in the FRS database. If a closeness match is found a case is created.

Click here to start investigation.
Results of Image Upload
Helpful Information for Court Order/Search Warrant

- For our purposes, the court order should indicate what type of photo you’re providing i.e. electronic, preexisting DOL photo, etc., that you want ran through FRS. Be sure to include the electronic image or WA DL/IP/ID card information (PIC number) for the subject.

- For the court’s purposes, we’ve seen the below wording:
  - your name/agency requests that the court order be authorized for the purpose of conducting a Facial Recognition query with WA State Dept of Licensing. This query should be used to identify any WA State driver license, instruction permit, identification card images that are similar to the individual pictured in provide information here in accordance with RCW 46.20.037. It is further requested that the information gathered be shared from the Facial Recognition query with your name, therefore, allowing the use and disclosure of the facial recognition matching system in the above cited case per court order.

- Often times the court order needs location information, so for your reference – the FRS system is housed at 1125 Washington ST SE Olympia WA 98507 in the Highways and Licenses Building and is operated by License Integrity Unit staff, Attn: JoAnna Shanafelt or Ashley Palmer. If you want to fax the court order to us, you can at 360-570-1246 or you can email it to fraud@dol.wa.gov and it will be forwarded to us.
CONTACT INFORMATION

- Mailing address:
  PO BOX 9029
  Olympia, WA 98507
  (360) 902-3915

- Email: fraud@dol.wa.gov
RCW 46.20.037
Facial recognition matching system.

(1) The department may implement a facial recognition matching system for drivers' licenses, permits, and identicards. Any facial recognition matching system selected by the department must be used only to verify the identity of an applicant for or holder of a driver's license, permit, or identicard to determine whether the person has been issued a driver's license, permit, or identicard under a different name or names.

(2) Any facial recognition matching system selected by the department must be capable of highly accurate matching, and must be compliant with appropriate standards established by the American association of motor vehicle administrators that exist on June 7, 2012, or such subsequent date as may be provided by the department by rule, consistent with the purposes of this section.

(3) The department shall post notices in conspicuous locations at all department driver licensing offices, make written information available to all applicants at department driver licensing offices, and provide information on the department's web site regarding the facial recognition matching system. The notices, written information, and information on the web site must address how the facial recognition matching system works, all ways in which the department may use results from the facial recognition matching system, how an investigation based on results from the facial recognition matching system would be conducted, and a person's right to appeal any determinations made under this chapter.

(4) Results from the facial recognition matching system:
   (a) Are not available for public inspection and copying under chapter 42.56 RCW;
   (b) May only be disclosed when authorized by a court order;
   (c) May only be disclosed to a federal government agency if specifically required under federal law; and
   (d) May only be disclosed by the department to a government agency, including a court or law enforcement agency, for use in carrying out its functions if the department has determined that person has committed one of the prohibited practices listed in RCW 46.20.0921 and this determination has been confirmed by a hearings examiner under this chapter or the person declined a hearing or did not attend a scheduled hearing.

(5) All personally identifying information derived from the facial recognition matching system must be stored with appropriate security safeguards. The office of the chief information officer shall develop the appropriate security standards for the department's use of the facial recognition matching system, subject to approval and oversight by the technology services board.

(6) The department shall develop procedures to handle instances in which the facial recognition matching system fails to verify the identity of an applicant for a renewal or
duplicate driver's license, permit, or identicard. These procedures must allow an
applicant to prove identity without using the facial recognition matching system.
[ 2012 c 80 § 1; 2006 c 292 § 1; 2004 c 273 § 3.]
NOTES:
Finding—Purpose—Effective date—2004 c 273: See notes following
RCW 9.35.020.
LIU Staff

- Administrator, Glenn Ball
- Two Supervisors
- Two Support Enforcement Technicians
- Five Driver/Vehicle Investigator 2’s
  - 1 Lead
- 10 Investigator 1’s
Facial Recognition System

- December 2007: FRS used on enhanced issuances only.
- 2007: Scrub of system, resulted 4 million potential matches. Since the scrub, we have gradually worked our way through the reviews of the 4 million records.
- October 2010-June 2011: Pilot project on all issuances.
- June 2012: DOL given authority to use FRS on all issuances.
- December 2014: Received an upgraded system.
Where do LIU’s Fraud cases originate?

- FRS
- Internal referral (LSR, Out of State Unit, Record Response Unit, Vehicle Licensing Offices, etc)
- External agency referral (LE, courts, DMV)
- Victim allegation
- Anonymous tip
Criteria for Priority Assignment

- A victim
- Three or more identities
- Habitual Traffic Offender (HTO)
- A suspended/revoked record
- Law enforcement/outside referral
- A 21 year old
- ID card fraud – no driver licenses issued on any of the records involved

This is the result of a 2,700 case backlog.
Motives of identity fraud

- DUI
- Suspended for other reasons (child support, tickets, failure to appear)
- Identity Theft
- Theft of Public Assistance (DSHS, L&I)
- Theft of SSA benefits
- False claim of US citizenship
- 21 for entry into bars
- Criminal Record
RCW 46.20.037 – Facial Recognition Matching system

- Authorizes DOL’s use
- Governs release to outside entities
  - The release requires a court order
Helpful Information for Court Order/Search Warrant

- For our purposes, the court order should indicate what type of photo you’re providing i.e. electronic, preexisting DOL photo, etc., that you want ran through FRS. Be sure to include the electronic image or WA DL/IP/ID card information (PIC number) for the subject.

- For the court’s purposes, we’ve seen the below wording:
  - *your name/agency requests that the court order be authorized for the purpose of conducting a Facial Recognition query with WA State Dept of Licensing. This query should be used to identify any WA State driver license, instruction permit, identification card images that are similar to the individual pictured in provide information here in accordance with RCW 46.20.037. It is further requested that the information gathered be shared from the Facial Recognition query with your name, therefore, allowing the use and disclosure of the facial recognition matching system in the above cited case per court order.*

- Often times the court order needs location information, so for your reference – the FRS system is housed at 1125 Washington ST SE Olympia WA 98507 in the Highways and Licenses Building and is operated by License Integrity Unit staff, Attn: JoAnna Shanafelt or Ashley Palmer. If you want to fax the court order to us, you can at 360-570-1246 or you can email it to fraud@dol.wa.gov and it will be forwarded to us.
Image Upload

- Allows photos to be uploaded into FRS for biometric matches to WA DOL photos
- DOL requires a court order signed by a judge to process a government agency’s image upload request (court, federal agency, law enforcement)
- Only .BMP, .JPG, or .PNG are valid file types for image uploads
- Photo must be a straight on image of subject’s face
- Quality of image will affect the results populated
- Seattle Police Department and Pierce County Sheriff’s Office have their own FRS.
Photo examples

- CA DL PHOTO
- BOOKING PHOTO
- WA BLACK AND WHITE
Candidate number can be adjusted by investigator.

1:N (Many) – Identification is the process of comparing the image template for one person (the Probe) to the image templates of every other person in the FRS database. If a closeness match is found a case is created.

Click here to start investigation
Results of Image Upload

[Diagram showing a software interface with a match and possible matches displayed]
QUESTIONS???
CONTACT INFORMATION

- Mailing address:
  PO BOX 9029
  Olympia, WA 98507
  (360) 902-3915

- Email: fraud@dol.wa.gov
DOL DIVISIONS

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS
HUMAN RESOURCES
INFORMATION SERVICES
CUSTOMER RELATIONS
PROGRAMS AND SERVICES
LIU Team

- Administrator, Glenn Ball
- Assistant Administrator/Manager
- Two Supervisors
- Two Support Enforcement Technicians
- One Customer Service Specialist 2
- Five Driver/Vehicle Investigator 2’s
  - 2 Enhanced Driver License
- 10 Investigator 1’s
SERVICES

- Driver license, Identification card photographs and applications for issuance
- Montages
- Vehicle inquires and transaction documents
- Facial Recognition Queries
- Driver and Vehicle Investigative assistance
- Undercover driver licenses and identification cards
How FRS works

LEADS LIST
 Probe
 Candidates, 2
Facial Recognition System

- **December 2007**: FRS used on enhanced issuances only.
- Scrubbed the system, resulting in 4 million potential matches. Since the scrub, we have gradually worked our way through the reviews of the 4 million records.
- **October 2010-June 2011**: Pilot project on all issuances.
- **June 2012**: DOL given authority to use FRS on all issuances.
- **December 2014**: Received an upgraded system.
Where do LIU’s Fraud cases originate?

- FRS
- Internal referral (LSR, Out of State Unit, Record Response Unit, Vehicle Licensing Offices, etc)
- External agency referral (LE, courts, DMV)
- Victim allegation
- Anonymous tip
Criteria for Priority Assignment

- A victim
- Three or more identities
- Habitual Traffic Offender (HTO)
- A suspended/revoked record
- Law enforcement/outside referral
- A 21 year old
- ID card fraud – no driver licenses issued on any of the records involved

This is the result of a 2,700 case backlog.
Motives of identity fraud

- DUI
- Suspended for other reasons (child support, tickets, failure to appear)
- Identity Theft
- Theft of Public Assistance (DSHS, L&I)
- Theft of SSA benefits
- False claim of US citizenship
- 21 for entry into bars
- Criminal Record
RCW 46.20.037 – Facial Recognition Matching system

- Authorizes DOL’s use
- Governs release to outside entities
  - The release requires a court order
For our purposes, the court order should indicate what type of photo you’re providing i.e. electronic, preexisting DOL photo, etc., that you want ran through FRS. Be sure to include the electronic image or WA DL/IP/ID card information (PIC number) for the subject.

For the court’s purposes, we’ve seen the below wording:

- your name/agency requests that the court order be authorized for the purpose of conducting a Facial Recognition query with WA State Dept of Licensing. This query should be used to identify any WA State driver license, instruction permit, identification card images that are similar to the individual pictured in provide information here in accordance with RCW 46.20.037. It is further requested that the information gathered be shared from the Facial Recognition query with your name, therefore, allowing the use and disclosure of the facial recognition matching system in the above cited case per court order.

Often times the court order needs location information, so for your reference – the FRS system is housed at 1125 Washington ST SE Olympia WA 98507 in the Highways and Licenses Building and is operated by License Integrity Unit staff, Attn: JoAnna Shanafelt or Ashley Palmer. If you want to fax the court order to us, you can at 360-570-1246 or you can email it to fraud@dol.wa.gov and it will be forwarded to us.
Image Upload

- Allows photos to be uploaded into FRS for biometric matches to WA DOL photos
- DOL requires a court order signed by a judge to process a government agency’s image upload request (court, federal agency, law enforcement)
- Only .BMP, .JPG, or .PNG are valid file types for image uploads
- Photo must be a straight on image of subject’s face
- Quality of image will affect the results populated
- Seattle Police Department and Pierce County Sheriff’s Office have their own FRS.
Photo examples

- CA DL PHOTO
- BOOKING PHOTO
- WA BLACK AND WHITE
INVESTIGATE

Candidate number can be adjusted by investigator.

1:N (Many) – Identification is the process of comparing the image template for one person (the Probe) to the image templates of every other person in the FRS database. If a closeness match is found a case is created.

Click here to start investigation.
Results of Image Upload
QUESTIONS????
CONTACT INFORMATION

• Mailing address:
  PO BOX 9029
  Olympia, WA 98507
  (360) 902-3915

• Email: fraud@dol.wa.gov

• http://www.dol.wa.gov/driverslicense/externallawenforcement.html