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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

ROGELIO MONTES and MATEO
ARTEAGA,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF YAKIMA; MICAH
CAWLEY, in his official capacity as
Mayor of Yakima; and MAUREEN
ADKISON, SARA BRISTOL, KATHY
COFFEY, RICK ENSEY, DAVE Ettl,
and BILL LOVER, in their official
capacity as members of the Yakima City
Council,

Defendants.

NO. 12-cv-3108-TOR

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED
REMEDIAL PLAN AND FINAL
INJUNCTION

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1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 On October 6, 2014, this Court invited the parties to file responses to the
3 competing proposed injunctive orders. ECF No. 120. Defendants now submit this
4 memorandum and ask this Court to adopt Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan as
5 set forth in their Proposed Final Judgment and modified by their subsequent
6 correspondence to this Court. ECF Nos. 116, 119.

7 Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan provides the most complete and
8 inclusive remedy for the Section 2 violation found by this Court. Defendants'
9 proposal offers an immediate opportunity for Latinos to elect their candidate of
10 choice and allows at least two more opportunities as the City's Latino
11 demographic matures and increases in size. Plaintiffs' proposal, in contrast, is
12 frozen in time. It effectively caps the number of City Council positions available
13 to Latinos at two, which fails to accommodate the pace of Latinos' growing
14 presence in the City.

15 Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan also lays the groundwork for Latinos
16 to elect an at-large representative through limited voting, which will enable all
17 Latinos in the City to have a political voice. Plaintiffs' proposal, on the other
18 hand, effectively disenfranchises the Latinos residing in five of Plaintiffs' seven
19 districts. By insisting solely on single-member districts, Plaintiffs' plan will
20 silence the political voice of nearly 60% of the eligible Latino voters in City
21 elections.

22 Lastly, Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan maintains some at-large
23 representation, which honors the City Council's longstanding practice and
24 legitimate, nondiscriminatory political desire to ensure that some
25

1 Councilmembers represent the entire City. Plaintiffs’ proposal balkanizes the City
2 into merely seven single-member districts and will result in Councilmembers who
3 are accountable only to their very small and limited geographic constituency.
4 Defendants’ plan does not adopt a “winner-takes-all” approach for their at-large
5 elections. Instead, Defendants propose a limited voting system, in which the two
6 candidates are determined by a plurality vote rule. This provides Latinos with an
7 opportunity to elect at-large candidates by reducing the ability of non-Latinos to
8 win every seat.

9 Defendants submit that their Proposed Remedial Plan is constitutionally
10 and legally acceptable and request that this Court to adopt it. However, if this
11 Court is not inclined to accept Defendants’ Proposed Remedial Plan, Defendants
12 ask this Court to adopt the proposal outlined in FairVote’s *amicus curiae* brief.
13 The plan submitted by FairVote is a variation of Defendants’ Proposed Remedial
14 Plan. Both plans enfranchise all Latinos in the City, regardless of the district in
15 which they reside, and both plans avoid carving up the entire City into seven
16 geographic fiefdoms. Additionally, FairVote’s proposal offers two immediate
17 opportunities for Latinos to elect their candidate of choice. The table below
18 compares the three proposals:

	Defendants' Proposal	FairVote's Proposal	Plaintiffs' Proposal
Configuration	5/2	4/3	7/0
At-large representation?	Yes	Yes	No
Political voice given to all Latinos?	Yes	Yes	No
Number of positions immediately obtainable with mathematical certainty	1	2	2
Maximum number of positions obtainable assuming continued historical crossover voting patterns	3	2	2
Likely number of positions controlled by Latinos with demographic maturation	3	2	2

In sum, Defendants ask this Court to adopt Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan as the most complete remedy that cures the Section 2 violation, provides an immediate opportunity for Latino voters, accommodates the demographic maturation of the City's Latinos, provides political influence for Latinos across the entire City, and assures that the interests of the entire City are addressed. In the alternative, Defendants' request that this Court adopt FairVote's proposal, which is also a superior alternative to Plaintiffs' all-single-member district plan.

1 **DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS**

2 **A. Defendants’ Proposed Remedial Plan**

3 Before this Court are three different proposals to remedy the Section 2
4 violation as found by this Court. The first proposal, submitted by Defendants on
5 October 3 and modified by subsequent correspondence on October 5, includes
6 five single-member districts and two at-large positions elected on a limited-voting
7 basis. By creating a single-member district with a Latino share of the citizen,
8 voting-age population (“CVAP”) at 53.46%, Defendants’ Proposed Remedial
9 Plan offers an immediate opportunity for Latinos to elect their candidate of choice
10 and cures the Section 2 violation.

11 Within the next two election cycles, the Latino share of citywide eligible
12 voters will have nearly reached the threshold of exclusion figure of 33.3% for a
13 two-seat limited voting system, which will offer Latinos a realistic opportunity
14 for a second position on the City Council. Declaration of Peter Morrison, Ph.D. in
15 Support of Defendants’ Response (“Morrison Decl.”) at ¶ 7. The threshold of
16 exclusion identifies the percentage of minority voters in a limited voting system
17 who must vote in order to elect a candidate of choice—assuming that there is no
18 majority crossover voting.

19 Within a similar timeframe, the LCVAP percentage in Defendants’
20 influence district will have reached the same level currently contained in
21 Plaintiffs’ influence district. Morrison Decl., Tbl. 2. Thus, Defendants’ proposal
22 would institute an enduring cure that would offer Latinos realistic opportunities to
23 elect one at-large Councilmember and two district Councilmembers.

1 Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan allows Councilmembers to serve out
2 the remainder of their terms, but offers almost no incumbency protection for the
3 four current district representatives who will stand for reelection in 2015 under
4 Defendants' proposal. The current three at-large representatives would need to
5 compete for two at-large positions in 2017 (which would have the likely effect of
6 splitting the non-Latino vote), step down from their current at-large position early
7 and contest a seat against an incumbent in District 4 or District 5 in 2015, or
8 decline to run for reelection altogether. Moreover, Defendants' opportunity
9 district (District 1, up for election in 2015) and Defendants' influence district
10 (District 2, up for election in 2017) contain no incumbents. Lastly, Defendants'
11 Proposed Order explicitly requires future redistricting efforts to preserve the
12 Latino share of the eligible voter population in Districts 1 and 5 when
13 apportioning the total population among the districts.

14 **B. Plaintiffs' All-Single-Member District Plan**

15 Plaintiffs' proposal, which they have not modified since Mr. Cooper
16 introduced it nearly 20 months ago, would simply divide the City into seven
17 single-member districts. Candidates would contest each district on a "winner-
18 takes-all" basis. Plaintiffs would have all seven positions appear on the 2015
19 ballot and would restart the current staggered-term system by having the
20 Councilmembers elected to the even-numbered positions for terms of two years.
21 Candidates would then contest the even-numbered seats in 2017, with the winners
22 serving four-year terms.

23 As measured by CVAP, Plaintiffs' plan contains one opportunity district
24 and one influence district. As measured by registered voters, however, their plan
25

1 purports to include two opportunity districts. In the remaining five districts in
2 Plaintiffs' plan, the Latino share of CVAP ranges from 7.11% (District 6) to
3 26.69% (District 4). According to estimates from Defendants' expert witness, Dr.
4 Peter Morrison, the Latino share of CVAP in District 4 will only reach 35.1% by
5 2027. Morrison Decl., Tbl. 3.

6 There is no doubt that the other five districts in Plaintiffs' plan will remain
7 under the control of non-Latinos for the foreseeable future. Nearly 60% of Latino
8 eligible voters currently reside in those five districts. Morrison Decl., ¶ 11.
9 Plaintiffs' plan is myopically focused on empowering fewer than half the City's
10 Latinos while depriving most Latinos of a meaningful political voice.

11 **C. FairVote's Proposal**

12 On October 20, this Court granted FairVote's motion for leave to file an
13 *amicus curiae* brief, which FairVote filed shortly thereafter. ECF Nos. 125, 126.
14 FairVote's proposal is similar to Defendants' in that both plans contain a blend of
15 district and at-large positions. As in Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan, the at-
16 large representatives are chosen on a limited-voting basis. This is a critical feature
17 absent from Plaintiffs' plan, which requires all candidates to be elected on a
18 "winner-takes-all," single-member district basis. Both Defendants' plan and
19 FairVote's plan incorporate limited voting, which enhances minority voting
20 opportunities to elect at-large representatives. Additionally, FairVote also
21 encourages a voter-education campaign to inform City voters about limited
22 voting. Defendants would not object to such a campaign.

23 FairVote proposes three at-large positions, rather than the two. Under the
24 threshold-of-exclusion model presented by Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Richard
25

1 Engstrom, increasing the number of at-large positions from two to three reduces
2 the threshold of exclusion from 33.3% to 25.0%. ECF No. 118-1 (Ex. 2 at 5).
3 According to Mr. Cooper, the Latino share of citywide eligible voters has already
4 reached 26.54% and is continuing to grow. ECF No. 118-1 (Ex. 3 at ¶ 3). As
5 such, FairVote's proposal results in at least one at-large position that is
6 immediately electable by Latinos.

7 FairVote did not submit a map along with their proposal. However, Dr.
8 Morrison has determined that a four-district map can be created with one district
9 in which Latinos would be a majority of registered voters in the forthcoming
10 election. Morrison Decl., ¶ 16. This became clear when, on October 3, Plaintiffs
11 revealed the figures supporting their proposed plan. ECF No. 118-1 (Ex. 1). In
12 two of Plaintiffs' seven districts, Latinos are a majority of the registered voters.
13 *Id.* Combining these two districts would create a single, larger district in which
14 Latinos would remain a majority of registered voters. Morrison Decl., ¶ 16.
15 However, because this district would contain approximately two-sevenths of the
16 City's overall total population, the district's total population figure would need to
17 be adjusted slightly to bring its share of the overall total population closer to one-
18 fourth. *Id.* This reduction can be accomplished while preserving the majority of
19 registered Latino voters in the district.¹ *Id.* The concentration of registered Latino
20 voters could also be increased by reassigning a small portion of this single, larger
21 district with a slightly lesser concentration of Latino registrants to neighboring
22 districts when balancing out the total population figures. *Id.* Thus, FairVote's
23

24 ¹ As part of their reply, Defendants intend to submit a four-district map
25 demonstrating the possibility of creating such a district.

1 proposal offers two immediate opportunities for Latinos to elect their candidate of
2 choice: The first through limited voting for the three at-large positions, and the
3 second through a district in which Latinos are the majority of registered voters.

4 FairVote's proposal also does not address the transition from the existing
5 system. However, the fairest and least disruptive transition would be to allow the
6 Councilmembers to serve out the remainder of their terms and hold elections in
7 2015 for the four district positions and elections in 2017 for the three at-large
8 positions. This would not require any restarting of the current staggered-term
9 system. The only changes would be to the district boundaries and the method by
10 which the at-large representations are chosen.

11 ARGUMENT

12 Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' proposal is legally unacceptable for three
13 reasons. First, Plaintiffs contend that a component of Defendants' Proposed
14 Remedial Plan violates state law. Whatever the merits were of this argument, the
15 issue is moot because Defendants have withdrawn this non-essential component
16 of their proposal.

17 Second, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants' proposal would perpetuate Latino
18 vote dilution by including some at-large positions on the City Council. At-large
19 elections, however, are not *per se* illegal and Defendants' Proposed Remedial
20 Plan utilizes a limited voting method that, under the circumstances of this case,
21 provides Latinos with a favorable opportunity to elect their candidate of choice.
22 Defendants' proposed at-large positions do not perpetuate Latino vote dilution.

23 Third, Plaintiffs argue that this Court should reject Defendants' Proposed
24 Remedial Plan because it does not immediately provide Latinos with a number of
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1 opportunity districts commensurate with the Latino share of the City's eligible
2 voters. This is not a basis for automatically rejecting Defendants' proposal.
3 However, even if this Court was concerned with adopting a plan that offers
4 immediate proportionality, Plaintiffs' insistence on maximizing the number of
5 opportunity districts is not the only path. FairVote's proposal, which immediately
6 provides two positions (one at-large and one district) in which Latinos could elect
7 their candidate of choice, is a superior and immediate alternative to Plaintiffs' all-
8 single-member district plan.

9 **A. Defendants' Plan Does Not Violate State Law**

10 As originally proposed, Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan would have
11 designated the two-large representatives as Mayor and Assistant Mayor. ECF No.
12 116 at ¶ 6. During the parties' discussions about their respective proposals,
13 Plaintiffs never objected to or suggested that this part of Defendants' proposal
14 might violate state law. Instead, Plaintiffs waited until they filed their proposal to
15 raise this criticism. ECF No. 117 at 5.

16 Although the challenged method of selecting Mayor and Assistant Mayor is
17 contemplated by state law, *see* RCW 35A.13.033, Defendants withdrew this
18 component to avoid controversy over a nonessential part of their proposal. ECF
19 No. 116. Plaintiffs' contention that Defendants' plan is not entitled to deference
20 because it violates state law is moot.

21 **B. The Inclusion of Two At-Large Positions in Defendants' Plan**
22 **Does Not Violate Section 2**

23 Plaintiffs contend that the presence of two at-large positions in Defendants'
24 Proposed Remedial Plan conflicts with Section 2 because "maintaining two at-
25

1 large seats preserves the very minority vote dilution that requires remediation.”
2 ECF No. 117 at 6. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, at-large positions are not
3 automatically illegal. Moreover, Defendants’ proposal removes the elements of
4 at-large elections that this Court found “blunt[ed] the effectiveness of voting
5 cohesively for one candidate,” namely the use of numbered posts, “winner-takes-
6 all” contents, and the head-to-head competitions. ECF No. 108 at 57. In fact, by
7 preserving at-large representation, Defendants’ plan is more inclusive than
8 Plaintiffs because it allows Latinos across the City to exercise political influence.
9 Plaintiffs’ proposal is only concerned with Latinos fortunate to live in two out of
10 Plaintiffs’ seven districts.

11 Plaintiffs’ examples of courts “routinely” rejecting mixed plans are
12 unpersuasive. ECF No. 117 at 6. In *Buchanan v. Jackson*, which Defendants
13 already distinguished in their initial memorandum, *see* ECF No. 113 at 15-16, the
14 city’s plan granted broad executive authority to the at-large representatives but
15 conferred ordinary legislative power to the district representatives. *Buchanan*, 683
16 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (W.D. Tenn. 1988). . The city’s plan also maintained a
17 majority-vote requirement for all positions, which “effectively preclude[d] a
18 black candidate from being elected” to the powerful at-large positions. *Id.* at
19 1543. Here, Defendants’ Proposed Remedial Plan neither bestows special status
20 on the at-large representatives nor maintains the “winner-take-all” requirement.
21 Each proposed remedial plan requires individual and careful examination, rather
22 than the one-size-fits-all approach advocated by Plaintiffs. *Buchanan*, 683 F.
23 Supp. at 1541 (quoting *Dillard v. Crenshaw Cnty.*, 831 F.2d 246, 250 (11th Cir.
24 1987)).

1 All the plans rejected in the other cases cited by Plaintiffs would have
2 required the at-large representatives to be elected on a “winner-take-all” basis.
3 *Harvell v. Blytheville School District*, 126 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 1997); *United*
4 *States v. Dallas Cnty. Comm.*, 850 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1988); *United States v.*
5 *Osceola Cnty.*, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (M.D. Fla. 2006); *League of United Latin*
6 *Am. Citizens, Council No. 4836 v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 648 F. Supp. 596
7 (W.D. Tex. 1986). Indeed, the rejected plan in *Osceola County* would have
8 increased the number of commissions from five to seven precisely to add two
9 “winner-take-all” at-large seats. *Id.* at 1254-55.

10 Plaintiffs also fail to mention the ample countervailing examples of courts
11 approving hybrid plans. *See, e.g., James v. Sarasota*, 611 F. Supp. 25 (M.D. Fla.
12 1985) (adopting a plan with three single-member districts and two at-large
13 positions); *Hines v. Ahoskie*, 998 F. 2d 1266 (4th Cir. 1993) (two districts with
14 two representatives each elected “by a plurality vote” and a fifth at-large
15 representative); *Tallahassee Branch of the NAACP v. Leon Cnty.*, 827 F.2d 1436
16 (11th Cir. 1987) (five single-member districts and two at-large positions); *NAACP*
17 *v. City of Columbia*, 850 F. Supp. 404 (D.S.C. 1993) (four single-member
18 districts and three at-large positions). As these cases demonstrate, “no particular
19 election scheme is required by Section 2.” *United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd.*,
20 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 752 n.11 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (“*Euclid Sch. Bd.*”).

21 Plaintiffs acknowledge that Defendants’ Proposed Remedial Plan
22 eliminates various features of the previous at-large elections, but assert that
23 Defendants’ proposed at-large elections still do not provide a meaningful chance
24 for Latinos to elect their candidate of choice. ECF No. 117 at 9-10. Plaintiffs base
25

1 their claim on “threshold of exclusion” analysis provided by their expert witness,
2 Dr. Engstrom. ECF No. 118-1 (Ex. 2 at 2-4). As Dr. Engstrom explains regarding
3 limited voting, the threshold of exclusion is a useful guideline for establishing
4 when a minority group is guaranteed to elect a candidate of choice, regardless of
5 whether it receives any majority crossover voting.

6 Dr. Engstrom opines that “Latinos must comprise 33.33% of the electorate
7 in order for their preferred candidate to win an at-large seat without the support of
8 non-Latino voters.” ECF No. 117 at 9. Although this figure is greater than the
9 current Latino share of eligible voters, the inexorable Latino demographic growth
10 in the City is beyond dispute. Projections provided by Defendants’ expert, Dr.
11 Peter Morrison, establish that citywide LCVAP will reach 30.7% by 2021,
12 placing them within effective reach of the threshold of exclusion when candidates
13 will contest the at-large positions for a second time.² Morrison Decl., Tbl. 1. By
14 then, even a modest degree of crossover voting (common in City Council
15 contests³) will afford Latinos a meaningful opportunity to elect their candidate of
16 choice.

17 Furthermore, this system of selecting candidates is not untested in the City.
18 Previous Latino candidates would have achieved electoral success had
19 Defendants’ Proposed Remedial Plan been implemented. Dave Ettl and Sonia
20 Rodriguez were the top two votegetters in a three-candidate primary for Position
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22 ² FairVote’s proposal of three at-large positions requires a threshold of exclusion
23 of 25%, which has already been met according to Mr. Cooper. ECF No. 118-1
24 (Ex. 3 at ¶ 3).

25 ³ See ECF No. 65 at ¶¶ 119, 122, 128, 131, 136, 151, 155.

1 5 in 2009. ECF 65 at ¶¶ 120-121. Bill Lover and Benjamin Soria were the top two
2 votegetters in a four-candidate primary for Position 7 in 2009. *Id.* at ¶¶ 124, 126.
3 Plaintiffs may cite the 2013 election cycle where Isidro Reynaga and Enrique
4 Jevons both failed to emerge from a three-person primary contest. These elections
5 do not negate the legitimacy of a modified at-large system. “[T]he ultimate right
6 of Section 2 is equality of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success.”
7 *League of United Am. Citizens v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399, 437 (2006). The 2009
8 elections demonstrate that limited voting will create such an opportunity for
9 Latinos.

10 Plaintiffs also suggest that Defendants’ at-large election proposal is
11 unappealing because of the “historic low turnout rates of Latinos in at-large
12 elections.” Pls.’ Mot. at 9. As Dr. Engstrom opined in an earlier case, however,
13 “[t]he increase in the Hispanic opportunity to elect a representative of their
14 choice, including a Hispanic representative or two, under a cumulative voting
15 arrangement is also likely to stimulate Hispanics to organize and mobilize more
16 in a cumulative voting election.” Declaration of Francis S. Floyd (“Floyd Decl.”),
17 Exhibit A at ¶ 25. Here, Defendants have proposed a limited, rather than
18 cumulative, voting system, but that is unimportant. “It is the opportunity to elect,
19 not the medium through which it is offered, that provides the stimulus to organize
20 and mobilize.”⁴ *Id.* at ¶ 26.

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23 ⁴ Additionally, Plaintiffs are selective in their reliance on low turnout rates. If
24 Plaintiffs wish to criticize Defendants’ modified at-large proposal by citing low
25 voter turnout rates, then the parties’ opportunity and influence districts should

1 Dr. Engstrom's threshold of exclusion analysis also assumes that the
2 Latino-preferred candidate will run against only two non-Latino candidates, and
3 that non-Latinos will not cast any votes for the Latino-preferred candidate. ECF
4 No. 118-1 (Ex. 2 at 3). As Dr. Engstrom has written, these are "worst-case
5 assumptions, from the minority group's perspective, about the behavior of the
6 other votes." Richard L. Engstrom, *Cumulative and Limited Voting: Minority*
7 *Electoral Opportunities and More*, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 97, 103 (2010)
8 (hereinafter "Engstrom").⁵ "If the worst-case assumptions concerning the voting
9 behavior of the other voters are violated, and it is hard to imagine an election in
10 which they are not, the group at issue could be smaller and/or less cohesive in its
11 preferences and still have a realistic opportunity to elect a representative or
12 representatives of their choice." Engstrom at 108. Thus, a threshold of exclusion
13 "does not identify a floor under which a group has no chance of electing a
14 representative of its choice, only a floor for when it can, theoretically, do so
15 without that candidate receiving any votes from other voters."⁶ *Id.*

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18 also be considered in light of the same low voter turnout rates, which would call
19 into question the efficacy of any remedial plan.

20 ⁵ For reference, Dr. Engstrom's entire article is attached to the Declaration of
21 Francis S. Floyd as Exhibit B.

22 ⁶ As referenced above, non-Latino crossover voting is common in the City. *See*
23 ECF No. 65 at ¶¶ 119, 122, 128, 131, 136, 151, 155. In at-large elections with
24 more than two candidates, Latinos have received between 11.4% to 42.6% of
25 non-Latino votes. *Id.* at ¶¶ 122, 128, 151, 155.

1 Plaintiffs are also critical of Defendants' limited voting proposal because it
2 is supposedly "untested in Washington" and "would be in tension with state
3 policy governing local election systems." ECF No. 117 at 10. However, Plaintiffs
4 do not identify any statute or policy that would conflict with Defendants'
5 proposal. At worst, Washington is silent on using limited voting in local elections,
6 which is not a ground for disapproving Defendants' proposal.⁷ *See United States*
7 *v. Vill. of Port Chester*, 407 F. Supp. 2d 411, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("The Court
8 also does not find that the absence of cumulative voting in other New York
9 villages means that Port Chester should get less deference, as Plaintiffs suggest.")

10 Lastly, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' limited voting proposal "do[es] not
11 address the barriers Latinos face in running for at-large positions in terms of
12 money and resources." ECF No. 117 at 10. Plaintiffs omit a study conducted last
13 year by the Yakima Herald-Republic establishing that increased spending in City
14 Council contests—regardless of whether Latino candidates were running—did
15 not translate into election victories.⁸ Plaintiffs' claim also discounts Latino
16 candidates with the resources and desire to represent the interests of the entire
17

18
19 ⁷ If anything, Washington is receptive to limited voting, which it employs in
20 statewide primaries.

21 ⁸ More campaign money doesn't always translate to victories, YAKIMA
22 HERALD REPUBLIC, October 6, 2013, available at
23 [http://www.yakimaherald.com/news/livenews/1554961-8/more-campaign-](http://www.yakimaherald.com/news/livenews/1554961-8/more-campaign-money-doesnt-always-translate-to-victories)
24 [money-doesnt-always-translate-to-victories](http://www.yakimaherald.com/news/livenews/1554961-8/more-campaign-money-doesnt-always-translate-to-victories) (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).

1 City. In any event, Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan addresses this concern
2 by offering an immediate opportunity district and an influence district.

3 Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendants' at-large, limited voting elections
4 reveals their shortsighted approach to Latino voting opportunities. Although
5 Plaintiffs' proposal purports to offer Latinos one opportunity district and one
6 near-opportunity district as measured by CVAP, the remaining five districts in
7 Plaintiffs' plan would not offer meaningful opportunities for Latino candidates to
8 elect their candidate of choice. Indeed, Dr. Morrison's projections show that
9 Plaintiffs' District 4, which contains the highest concentration of LCVAP outside
10 of Districts 1 and 2, will achieve a LCVAP percentage of only 35.1% by 2027.
11 Morrison Decl., Tbl. 3.

12 In effect, Plaintiffs are asking the Court to cap the number of seats that
13 Latinos could meaningfully achieve at two and to guarantee the remaining five
14 seats for non-Latinos. Although Defendants' plan incorporates the anticipated
15 demographic maturation of the City's Latinos, Defendants' plan offers Latinos
16 the potential of at least three seats that they could meaningfully achieve.⁹
17 Moreover, Defendants' plan will allow candidates from Latino-controlled districts
18 to represent a larger share of eligible Latino voters. Under Defendants' plan,
19 Latinos will eventually control two out of five districts—currently 56.3% of the

20 _____
21 ⁹ Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan is a "mirage" because
22 subsequent redistricting will dilute Latino voting strength in Defendants'
23 opportunity and influence districts. ECF No. 117 at 15 n.5. Plaintiffs overlook the
24 part of Defendants' proposed order requiring that the preservation concentration
25 of eligible Latino voters. ECF No. 116 at ¶ 10.

1 City's eligible Latino voters—instead of two out of seven districts under
2 Plaintiffs' plan—currently only 40.6% of the City's eligible Latino voters. ECF
3 No. 114 (Declaration of Peter Morrison, Ph.D. in Support of Defendants'
4 Proposed Remedial Plan) at ¶ 10.

5 Both Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan and FairVote's proposal offer
6 an additional advantage compared to Plaintiffs' plan. Carving a jurisdiction into
7 all single-member districts, as Plaintiffs propose, “confine[s] the opportunity to
8 elect to just those [minority] voters who reside within a [minority] opportunity
9 district.” Engstrom at 113. As noted by Dr. Morrison, nearly 60% of the City's
10 eligible Latino voters reside outside of Plaintiffs' opportunity and influence
11 districts. Morrison Decl., ¶ 11. Thus, under Plaintiffs' proposal, a majority of
12 adult Latino citizens in the City would not have a meaningful opportunity to elect
13 a representative of the group's choice for the foreseeable future. Plaintiffs' plan
14 designates this group of Latino voters as losers in the “representational lottery” of
15 all single-member district plans.¹⁰ LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE

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17 ¹⁰ Plaintiffs will likely note that the Ninth Circuit has held that “[d]istricting plans
18 with some members of the minority group outside the minority-controlled
19 districts are valid.” *Gomez v. Watsonville*, 863 F.2d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1988).
20 The context of this pronouncement is inapplicable here. The Ninth Circuit was
21 addressing the defendants' argument that the court should reject plaintiffs'
22 demonstrative plan under the first *Gingles* factor because the plan located
23 approximately 60% of eligible Latino voters outside the majority-minority
24 districts. *Id.* The Ninth Circuit concluded that this was not a barrier to satisfying
25 the first *Gingles* factor. *Id.* *Gomez* does not detract from Defendants' position that

1 MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 121
2 (1994).

3 In contrast, both Defendants' and FairVote's proposals avoid "trad[ing] off
4 the rights of some members of a racial group against the rights of other members
5 of that group." *League of United Am. Citizens v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399, 437 (2006).
6 Both proposals "provide all of the minority group's voters in a jurisdiction,
7 regardless of where they reside, with an opportunity to participate in electing a
8 representative of the group's choice, rather than just those residing in the
9 majority-minority district." Engstrom at 114. As Dr. Engstrom has written, "[i]t
10 would certainly be a rational policy choice to allow *all* of the minority voters to
11 participate in the opportunity to elect representatives favored by their group." *Id.*
12 (emphasis added). In this sense, Defendants' and FairVote's proposals provide a
13 "full and complete remedy"¹¹ because "minority vote dilution in at-large system
14 is a jurisdiction-wide problem; it affects all minority voters residing within a
15 jurisdiction, not just those residing in a particular area that can provide the basis
16 for a majority-minority [single-member district]." Engstrom at 114. Plaintiffs'
17 plan is incomplete, as it excludes nearly 60% of the City's eligible Latino voters.
18 The jurisdiction-wide problem of vote dilution is solved by affording all—not just
19 some—eligible Latino voters a meaningful opportunity to elect their candidate of
20 choice.

21
22
23 their plan is superior because it extends an avenue of empowerment to all eligible
24 Latino voters in the City.

25 ¹¹ *Shirt v. Hazeltine*, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1052 (D.S.D. 2004).

1 In sum, the inclusion of two at-large positions elected through a limited
2 voting system does not violate Section 2. Courts may evaluate proposed remedial
3 plans both “by difference from the old system” and “by prediction.” *Dillard v.*
4 *Crenshaw Cnty.*, 831 F.2d 246, 250 (11th Cir. 1987). The inexorable
5 demographic growth of the eligible Latino voter population is more than a
6 “prediction” and is certainly not a “wait-and-see approach,” as Plaintiffs allege.
7 ECF No. 117 at 14. Even accepting the “worst-case assumptions,” Engstrom at
8 103, about the number of non-Latino candidates and the behavior of non-Latino
9 voters, the City’s eligible Latino voter population will nearly reach the threshold
10 of exclusion before the at-large positions are contested for the second time under
11 Defendants’ Proposed Remedial Plan. Under FairVote’s proposal, the threshold
12 of exclusion has already been met. Of the three proposals before this Court, only
13 Plaintiffs’ plan fails to offer a complete remedy for all Latinos in the City by
14 affording them a meaningful political voice.

15 **C. Creating Less Than Seven Single-Member Districts Does Not**
16 **Dilute Latino Voting Strength**

17 Plaintiffs claim Defendants’ plan violates Section 2 because it fails to offer
18 the maximum number of single-member districts to Latinos. However, “[a]
19 district court may reject the defendant’s proposal under only one condition: if that
20 proposal ‘is legally unacceptable because it violates anew constitutional or
21 statutory voting rights – that is, whether it fails to meet the same standards
22 applicable to an original challenge of a legislative plan in place.” *Euclid Sch. Bd.*,
23 632 F. Supp. 2d at 750 (quoting *McGhee v. Granville Cnty.*, 860 F.2d 110, 115
24 (4th Cir. 1988)). As the Supreme Court has explained, however, a plaintiff cannot
25

1 maintain a Section 2 claim solely on the basis that a local jurisdiction has not
2 maximized minority voting strength. *Johnson v. De Grandy*, 512 U.S. 997, 1006
3 (1994) (“Failure to maximize cannot be the measure of § 2.”) Under *Johnson*, it
4 would be difficult for a putative plaintiff to challenge Defendants’ Proposed
5 Remedial Plan, were it implemented, under Section 2 for simply failing to
6 maximize the number of Latino opportunity districts. Thus, Defendants’ proposal
7 does not necessarily “fail[] to meet the same standards applicable” to Plaintiffs’
8 claim in this case. *Euclid Sch. Bd.*, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 750.

9 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ Proposed Remedial Plan is
10 illegal because it fails a “proportionality analysis.” ECF No. 117 at 13. That is,
11 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ proposal is unacceptable because it offers
12 Latinos a “reasonable opportunity at just one seat out of seven,” while Plaintiffs’
13 proposal gives Latinos “an opportunity to elect their candidate of choice in two
14 out of seven seats.”¹² *Id.* This Court should reject this argument.

15 The Supreme Court in *Johnson* introduced the concept of proportionality
16 (“the number of majority-minority voting districts to minority members’ share of
17 the population”) into Section 2 claims, but only as a consideration under the
18 Senate Factors. *Johnson*, 512 U.S. at 1014 n.11. Although the presence of

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20 ¹² Ironically, Plaintiffs’ “proportionality analysis” actually disfavors their own
21 proposal over the coming years. Over a longer timeline, Plaintiffs’ plan imposes a
22 ceiling of two positions that are meaningfully available to Latinos, while
23 Defendants’ plan offers two district positions and at least one at-large position.
24 Therefore, Defendants have better attuned their proposal to the demographic
25 growth of the City’s Latino population.

1 “proportionality” is not a “safe harbor” for local jurisdictions, its existence
2 weighs against a finding of vote dilution in the liability phase of a Section 2
3 claim. *Id.* at 1020-21.

4 Plaintiffs mistakenly equate this holding in *Johnson* to the proposition that
5 a remedial plan is illegal unless it immediately affords proportionality. As one
6 court explained when confronting a similar contention, this argument “confuses
7 the use of proportionality as one tool through which a reviewing court determines
8 the possible existence of vote dilution on the one hand, with a guarantee of
9 proportional representation on the other.” *Euclid Sch. Bd.*, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 753
10 (citing *Solomon v. Liberty Cnty. Comm’rs*, 221 F.3d 1218, 1224 (11th Cir. 2000);
11 *Johnson*, 512 U.S. at 1014 n. 11).

12 In *McGhee v. Granville County*, the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’
13 argument that the defendants’ proposal was illegal because it did not provide the
14 minority group “a chance to elect a number of commissioners that is
15 commensurate with their portion of the population and with their voting
16 strength.” *Id.*, 860 F.2d at 113. The court held that this was a “legally erroneous
17 standard[] against which to measure” the adequacy of a remedial plan. *Id.* at 118.
18 The court began by noting that Section 2 expressly disavows the “right to have
19 members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
20 population.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). In the liability phase of a Section 2 claim, this
21 repudiation would prevent a finding of vote dilution “based solely on a lack of
22 proportional representation.” *McGhee*, 860 F.2d at 119.

23 The Fourth Circuit rejected the notion that courts were free to then ignore
24 this statutory disavowal in the remedy phase by “find[ing] invalid a proposed
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1 legislative remedy which fell short of assuring approximate proportional
2 representation and substitut[ing] one of its own which did.” *Id.* at 119-120. “The
3 practical consequence of uncoupling violation from remedy in this way would
4 necessarily be to allow proportional representation to become in practical effect
5 the ‘right’ protected by § 2.” *Id.* at 120.

6 However, to the extent that this Court is concerned with adopting a plan
7 that contains a number of immediate election opportunities commensurate with
8 the population of eligible Latino voters in the City, FairVote’s proposal provides
9 immediate proportionality and is a superior alternative to Plaintiffs’ all single-
10 member district plan. It is a mathematical certainty that a four-district map can be
11 created with one district in which Latinos are a majority of registered voters.
12 Morrison Decl., ¶ 16. Plaintiffs have expressed their support for using registered-
13 voter percentage as an alternative benchmark of an opportunity district. ECF No.
14 117 at 11-12. The threshold of exclusion for a three-seat, single-vote system is
15 25%, which the citywide LCVAP percentage has already exceeded according to
16 Mr. Cooper. ECF No. 118-1 (Ex. 3 at ¶3). Thus, FairVote’s proposal immediately
17 offers two positions in which Latinos have a meaningful opportunity to elect their
18 candidate of choice.

19 Additionally, FairVote’s proposal sustains some form of at-large
20 representation, which embodies the City Council’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
21 political decision that at least some Councilmembers should be concerned with
22 and accountable to the entire City. Even when choosing among plans other than
23 those submitted by the local government, courts “must, to the greatest extent
24 possible, effectuate the policies and preferences in the defendant’s remedial
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1 plan.” *Euclid Sch. Bd.*, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 749-50. FairVote’s proposal honors the
2 City’s political judgments, while Plaintiffs repudiate them.

3 Plaintiffs’ insistence on maximizing the number of opportunity districts to
4 provide immediate proportionality also raises concerns about racial
5 gerrymandering. “Classification on the basis of race is constitutionally suspect—
6 ‘whether or not the reason for the racial classification is benign or the purpose is
7 remedial.’” *Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of*
8 *Comm’rs*, 996 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (quoting *Shaw v. Hunt*,
9 517 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1996) (“*Shaw I*”). Although Plaintiffs’ plan purports to
10 consider some traditional redistricting criteria such as geographical compactness
11 and approximate equality of total population, ethnicity was clearly the
12 “predominant factor” motivating the creation of Plaintiffs’ plan. *Miller v.*
13 *Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). Under strict scrutiny review, Plaintiffs’ plan
14 must be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.” *Id.* at 920 (citing
15 *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630, 653-57 (1993) (“*Shaw I*”). Remedying a Section 2
16 violation is assumed to be a compelling state interest. *Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 952,
17 977 (1996) (plurality). A narrowly-tailored remedy “substantially addresses” the
18 Section 2 violation, but does not do more than what is “reasonably necessary” to
19 ensure compliance. *Id.* (internal quotation omitted).

20 Here, Defendants’ Proposed Remedial Plan is narrowly tailored because it
21 offers an immediate opportunity district and lays the groundwork for two
22 additional positions on the City Council that Latinos will have a realistic chance
23 of electing. To the extent this Court seeks to remedy the Section 2 violation by
24 adopting a plan that ensures immediate electoral opportunities commensurate
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1 with the Latino share of eligible voters, FairVote’s proposal is also narrowly
2 tailored because it provides immediate proportionality while avoiding the
3 sacrifice of core political and democratic values. Plaintiffs’ plan, in contrast, is
4 not narrowly tailored because it purports to offer immediate proportionality while
5 depriving most Latinos of a political voice and snuffing out the legitimate
6 political principle of ensuring that some Councilmembers are elected by and
7 accountable to the entire City. Plaintiffs’ plan should be avoided because it
8 elevates ethnicity more than is “reasonably necessary” to comply with Section 2.
9 *Vera*, 517 U.S. at 977. This Court should adopt a more ethnically neutral and
10 equally effective remedy.

11 **CONCLUSION**

12 Defendants respectfully request that this Court adopt Defendants’ Proposed
13 Remedial Plan or, in the alternative, adopt FairVote’s proposal.

14
15 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of October, 2014.

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